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LOST IN TRANSLATION: Statistical Inference 
in Court 
Erica Beecher-Monas* 
Scientists and jurists may appear to speak the same language, but they 
often mean very different things. The use of statistics is basic to scientific 
endeavors. But judges frequently misunderstand the terminology and 
reasoning of the statistics used in scientific testimony. The way scientists 
understand causal inference in their writings and practice, for example, 
differs radically from the testimony jurists require to prove causation in court. 
The result is a disconnect between science as it is practiced and understood 
by scientists, and its legal use in the courtroom. Nowhere is this more evident 
than in the language of statistical reasoning. 
Unacknowledged difficulties in reasoning from group data to the 
individual case (in civil cases) and the absence of group data in making 
assertions about the individual (in criminal cases) beset the courts. Although 
nominally speaking the same language, scientists and jurists often appear to 
be in dire need of translators. Since expert testimony has become a mainstay 
of both civil and criminal litigation, this failure to communicate creates a 
conundrum in which jurists insist on testimony that experts are not capable 
of giving, and scientists attempt to conform their testimony to what the courts 
demand, often well beyond the limits of their expertise. 
This garbled communication has severe consequences in both civil and 
criminal litigation. Particularly in medical causation and criminal 
identification cases, courts routinely exclude testimony that is scientifically 
sound, and admit expert testimony that is wholly lacking in scientific basis. 
Not only do jurists misunderstand the meaning of common terms like 
statistical significance, confidence intervals, and relative risk, but they 
pervasively misunderstand the limits of statistical inference drawing. 
Statistics are crucial to the scientific enterprise. Statistics can be very 
helpful in determining the size of a scientific study, accounting for 
randomness, and comparing risks, among other things.1 All scientific fields 
make use of statistics. But what statistics cannot do—nor can the fields 
                                                                                                                       
*. Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. Thanks to Steve Winter and 
Terence Anderson for their comments, and to the excellent editors of this Law Journal for their 
editorial assistance. 
1. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. BRACKEN, RISK, CHANCE, AND CAUSATION: INVESTIGATING THE 
ORIGINS AND TREATMENT OF DISEASE 127 (2013) (discussing the role of statistics in designing 
studies). 
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employing statistics, like epidemiology and toxicology, and DNA 
identification, to name a few—is to ascribe individual causation. 
Statistics is the law of large numbers. It can tell us much about 
populations. It can tell us, for example, that so-and-so is a member of a group 
that has a particular chance of developing cancer. It can tell us that exposure 
to a chemical or drug increases the risk to that group by a certain percentage. 
What statistics cannot do is tell which exposed person with cancer developed 
it because of exposure. This creates a conundrum for the courts, because 
nearly always the legal question is about the individual rather than the group 
to which the individual belongs. 
Not that experts are unwilling to ascribe individual causation. On the 
contrary; such testimony is a mainstay in both civil and criminal litigation. 
The problem is that such testimony exceeds the capacity of science, and the 
experts are therefore testifying beyond the limits of their scientific expertise. 
For example, in toxic torts, where courts demand testimony on both 
general and specific causation, while general causation in the form of a 
population statement is similar to what these experts (epidemiologists and 
others) do in their respective fields, the specific causation statement is not. 
Specific causation experts—generally medical doctors—attempt to 
determine individual causation through what the courts call “differential 
etiology.”2 Differential etiology, however, “is an exercise designed for the 
courtroom.”3 Medical schools do not teach it. It is not a part of doctors’ 
normal practice. 
Diagnosis—which doctors are trained in—involves assessing symptoms 
and running tests, but outside of infectious diseases, does not ordinarily 
involve determining causation. Figuring out what the illness is and treating it 
are the normal tasks for doctors. The doctor who diagnoses “cancer” does not 
(and cannot scientifically) determine the cause. There may be many causes, 
some of them interacting. Yet courts require testimony that goes beyond what 
medicine can do. 
While the chasm in medical causation cases is the inability of science to 
reason from the general data to the individual, conversely, in criminal cases—
outside of DNA testimony—there is a striking absence of general data. 
Instead, the reasoning in criminal identification focuses strictly on the 
                                                                                                                       
2. David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2I) Inference in Scientific Expert 
Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 435 n.79 (2014). 
3. A. Philip Dawid et al., Fitting Science into Legal Contexts: Assessing Effects of Causes 
or Causes of Effects?, 43 SOC. METHODS & RES. 359, 369 (2014); see also CAUSALITY: 
STATISTICAL PERSPECTIVES AND APPLICATIONS, at xxiii (Carlo Berzuini, Philip Dawid & Luisa 
Bernardinelli eds., 2012) (noting that “it may simply be impossible, even with the best data in the 
world, to estimate causes of effects at the individual level without making arbitrary and 
empirically untestable additional assumptions.”). 
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individual, claiming that each individual is unique, without general data to 
support that claim. Forensic science experts are willing to testify to the 
uniqueness of particular patterns (in fingerprints, for example) without any 
general population data. The assumptions on which such testimony is based 
exceed the current bounds of science, and reflect a profound 
misunderstanding of statistical inference drawing. Nonetheless, this 
testimony is routinely admitted in our criminal courts. 
The lack of understanding about what statistics can and cannot do—and 
therefore what scientists who rely on statistics can legitimately say about the 
issues before the court—has severe repercussions in a legal system that 
depends as heavily as ours on expert testimony. The goal of this article is to 
provide translation of complex statistical concepts currently confounding 
judicial admissibility decisions, enabling courts to better determine when 
expert testimony is genuinely helpful to the jury. This article proceeds in 
three parts. Part II discusses judicial gatekeeping requirements, relevance and 
reliability standards, as they relate to expert testimony. Part III focuses on 
statistical misunderstandings in civil and criminal courts. Part IV explores 
possible solutions to the conundrum faced by experts and the courts. Part V 
concludes that correct translation of statistical concepts and their inherent 
limitations is key to achieving justice in our courts. 
! GATEKEEPING: THE MEANING OF RELEVANCE 
The commitment to a rational system of evidence entails the exclusion of 
irrelevant information.4 Even scholars arguing for “free proof” acknowledge 
the importance of screening information to ensure that it has some tendency 
to make a disputed issue in the case more or less probable.5 Only facts having 
rational probative value should be admissible in the search for truth.6 If 
something is not logically probative, no rational system of evidence should 
                                                                                                                       
4. See William Twining, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in 
RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 32 (1990) (discussing the rationalist tradition). 
5. See, e.g., Michael S. Pardo, On Misshapen Stones and Criminal Law’s Epistemology, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 347, 354–63 (2007) (book review). 
6. The doctrines of relevance and probativity are expressed as follows under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence: “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining 
the action.” FED. R. EVID. 401; and “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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consider it. Something is relevant or not, in relation to a disputed legal issue 
(the facet of relevance that the Daubert court referred to as “fit”7). 
Admissibility of expert testimony in federal courts is governed by Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702, which places the threshold of admissibility at 
helpfulness to the jury.8 In its transformative Daubert opinion, the Supreme 
Court replaced the nearly universal general consensus standard for the 
admissibility of scientific expert testimony9 with a requirement that judges 
must evaluate the scientific validity of expert testimony.10 As the Daubert 
Court explained, the requirement that expert testimony assist the trier of fact 
“goes primarily to relevance.”11 Daubert, currently the predominant rule on 
the admissibility of expert testimony,12 emphasized “appropriate validation” 
and “good grounds” as the cornerstones of admissibility.13 Gatekeeping for 
judges who simply do not understand the statistical inferences that they are 
required to evaluate becomes a muddle. In the civil cases, courts tend to rely 
on rules of thumb and bright line cut-offs (like requiring relative risks of two 
or more and rejecting confidence intervals that include relative risks of one) 
and asking for medical testimony that doctors are not capable of giving. In 
the criminal cases (with the exception of DNA evidence) the statistical 
misunderstandings are nearly the reverse of those in the civil toxic tort cases. 
Rather than insisting on general population testimony first (as courts do with 
general causation testimony in toxic torts), criminal courts start with the 
individual (what in toxic torts would be called specific causation) and never 
get to the general. This misunderstanding of statistics is extremely troubling 
because it affects the search for truth on which our legal system is based. 
The Daubert Court also noted that “evidentiary reliability will be based 
on scientific validity.”14 So when it comes to expert testimony, relevance 
must be considered in tandem with reliability.15 Daubert and amended Rule 
                                                                                                                       
7. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). 
8. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 begins with the proviso that expert testimony is 
admissible only if “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702. 
9. The general consensus standard originated with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 
(D.C. Cir. 1923) (scientific testimony must “be sufficiently established to have gained general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”). 
10. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. 
11. Id. 
12. See generally David L. Faigman & John Monahan, Psychological Evidence at the Dawn 
of the Law’s Scientific Age, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 631, 632 (2005) (observing that the Daubert 
test applies in all federal cases, and a majority of states have adopted the Daubert framework). 
13. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
14. Id. at 509 n.9. 
15. Justice Blackmun explained that reliability for admissibility purposes is different from 
what scientists call reliability (which he defined as getting “consistent results”) in that for legal 
 
 
 
 
 
46:1057] LOST IN TRANSLATION 1061 
702 both stress reliability of expert testimony as a facet of relevance, and 
therefore of admissibility.16 This is a particular problem in criminal 
identification cases, because reliability requires sufficient data, a requirement 
that—in the absence of general data about the prevalence of particular 
patterns in the population—criminal individuation testimony cannot meet. In 
toxic torts, the reliability problem appears in specific causation testimony, 
which is not reliable because the inference leap from general data to 
individual causation is unsupported by science. 
The courts’ muddle over statistically based testimony goes in both 
directions: individuation testimony may appear to have legal fit but, because 
it lacks empirical support, fail to be relevant. General causation testimony 
based on statistical significance, relative risk and confidence intervals, on the 
other hand, has both legal fit and scientific basis, and ought not to be excluded 
for failing to meet judicially imposed standards that do not affect their 
validity. 
Admitting only relevant evidence is key to preventing the danger that 
irrelevancies may be mistaken as bearing on the question at hand. Admitting 
irrelevant information may make the ultimate decision unfounded and 
inaccurate (or, if accurate, only by chance). Such evidence is affirmatively 
misleading. If the input is wrong, no reasoning process can be expected to 
make correct inferences.17 
Although inaccuracy is a possible factor in any evidence, not just expert 
testimony, baseless expert testimony is particularly pernicious because the 
entire reason it is being admitted is that the jury lacks the background 
knowledge necessary to evaluate it.18 (So do judges, but judges at least have 
the benefit of training in critical thinking, guidelines for the evaluation of 
scientific testimony, repeat exposure and a measure of accountability.)19 
                                                                                                                       
purposes, reliability means scientific validity (which he defined as “the principle supports what it 
purports to show” and “trustworthiness”). Id. 
16. FED. R. EVID. 702 (to be admissible, expert testimony must be based on sufficient data, 
and reliable methods); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (courts should screen expert evidence for 
relevance and reliability). 
17. See Alvin I. Goldman, Simple Heuristics and Legal Evidence, 2 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 
215, 219 (2003) (explaining that even deductive reasoning requires true premises in order to reach 
true conclusions). 
18. See Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How 
the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 30 (2003) (Daubert 
implies a view that misleading expert evidence is worse—and less amenable to correction through 
cross-examination—than misleading lay testimony). 
19. See ERICA BEECHER-MONAS, EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL DUE PROCESS 33–35 (2007) (discussing 
why judicial gatekeeping has more potential for reaching accurate conclusions about expert 
testimony than simply admitting the evidence subject to cross-examination). 
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The problem for individuation testimony (specific causation and criminal 
identification) is that because it is without scientific basis, it cannot assist the 
jury. Unlike testimony based on studies that fail statistical significance, 
relative risk or confidence interval limits set by the courts—which may make 
the testimony shaky but still admissible—individuation testimony should be 
excluded. While cross-examination and the presentation of contradictory 
expert testimony are the traditional cures for “attacking shaky but admissible 
evidence,”20 and thus correct testimony based on studies with statistical 
significance levels less than 95%, relative risks less than two, and confidence 
intervals that include the relative risk of one, expert testimony that lacks any 
empirical basis is resistant to this kind of correction. In the absence of data, 
the assumptions made by an expert sound perfectly plausible.21 That is a 
problem for both specific causation and criminal identification evidence.22 
! CONUNDRA IN THE COURTS 
A.! Civil Toxic Torts 
Courts in toxic tort cases require proof of causation at two levels: general 
causation and specific causation. To prove general causation, courts tend to 
require testimony based on epidemiology that a particular chemical to which 
the plaintiff was exposed is capable of causing injuries like that suffered by 
the plaintiff. Sometimes this testimony is supplemented by toxicology, 
physiology and chemical structure testimony. Specific causation is proved 
                                                                                                                       
20. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means 
of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”). 
21. Justice Learned Hand (well over a century ago) expressed the jury’s dilemma with 
respect to expert testimony, “how can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon 
an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own?” Learned Hand, Historical and Practical 
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901). 
22. In mock jury studies about the effectiveness of cross-examination in criminal cases, it 
apparently made little difference whether the defense challenged the expert testimony; whether 
the defense pointed out in cross examination that the expert’s conclusions were inconsistent with 
prior research and that the expert had not followed standard methodology; and whether the 
defense not only cross-examined the prosecution expert, but also put on its own expert. See Joseph 
Sanders, The Merits of Paternalistic Justifications for Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert 
Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 936 (2003) (discussing the experimental work of Shari 
Diamond et al., and concluding that “rulings excluding unreliable evidence promote jury accuracy 
even if we assume jurors are as good as judges in assessing reliability.”). Although jurors in these 
studies discussed the expert evidence in their deliberations, and although there was a strong 
correlation between the prosecution expert’s testimony and the jury’s verdict preferences, the 
results did not vary among the first three conditions. Id. at 934. 
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through testimony of medical doctors that exposure to the defendant’s 
chemical was the cause of the plaintiff’s injury. 
This sounds pretty straight-forward, but it is not so simple. Causation in 
the biological sciences is complex and probabilistic. It is not like Newtonian 
causation (an example of which would be throwing a stone through a 
window, causing it to shatter). Rather, biologic causation is probabilistic, 
with many factors converging to cause disease. Both genetics and 
environment are undoubtedly involved in nearly every case of illness.23 
Moreover, quite a few diseases appear in the general population without 
known cause (a phenomenon referred to in medical practice as “idiopathic” 
disease). The same kind of cancers, for example, may appear in the general 
population without any known toxic exposure as may appear after toxic 
exposure. And determining which identically manifested disease was caused 
by which factor is beyond the capacity of medical science.24 Indeed, 
epidemiologists speak in terms of causal pies rather than a single cause. It is 
simply not possible to infer logically whether a specific factor caused a 
particular illness.25 
Causation in cancer (and probably other diseases as well) tends to have 
multiple pathways.26 Long latency periods between exposure to a carcinogen 
and disease manifestation add to the uncertainty. Epidemiologists are also 
increasingly considering the role of individual genetic susceptibility 
exacerbated by environmental exposure. 
Probabilistic reasoning relies on statistical concepts of randomness. 
Judges (and most people) struggle with these statistical concepts. Although 
statistical concepts are basic to understanding causation in biological 
systems, this kind of probabilistic reasoning does not mesh well with tort law, 
and some judges handle the uncertainty better than others.27 Adding to the 
                                                                                                                       
23. Kenneth J. Rothman, a preeminent epidemiologist, illustrates the concept that “every 
causal mechanism involves the joint action of a multitude of component causes” as a causal pie, 
in which “some component causes play a more important role than other factors in the causation 
of disease.” KENNETH J. ROTHMAN, EPIDEMIOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 24–25 (2d ed. 2012). 
24. For example, phenylketonuria, which results in mental retardation, is usually considered 
a genetic disease, but the mental retardation that results from it can be prevented by diet. See id. 
at 24. 
25. As Rothman explained the problem, “it is not possible to infer logically whether a 
specific factor was the cause of an observed event.” Id. at 250. 
26. See, e.g., Mel Greaves, Cancer Causation: The Darwinian Downside of Past Success?, 
3 LANCET ONCOLOGY 244 (2002) (proposing a causal network explanation of cancer causation). 
27. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Science and the Law: Uncomfortable Bedfellows, 38 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1379, 1391 (2008) (explaining how, as a federal district court judge, he resolved 
the uncertainty issue raised by the absence of an epidemiology study in the ephedra litigation by 
permitting plaintiffs’ experts to testify “that there is a reliable basis to believe that ephedra may 
be a contributing cause of cardiac injury and strokes in people with high blood pressure, certain 
serious heart conditions, or a genetic sensitivity to ephedra—provided that such experts qualify 
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confusion is the judicial bifurcation of proof into general and specific 
causation, neither of which is a concept used by scientists in their practices. 
All this uncertainty tends to make causation a highly problematic area for 
toxic torts. 
! General Causation: Cursory Checklists and Bottom Lines 
Terms such as statistical significance, relative risk (or its close cousin, the 
odds ratio), and confidence interval are ubiquitous in epidemiological 
testimony.28 Rather than attempting to understand these as inter-related 
concepts, judges far too often treat them as separate thresholds that each study 
relied upon must cross. Using these concepts as exclusionary rules is a drastic 
misinterpretation of their meaning.29 
! Statistical Significance 
The courts frequently treat statistical significance as either being present 
or not. These judges exclude testimony based on studies that fail to meet 
statistical significance at an observed significance level of 95% (or P-value 
of 0.05), reducing statistical significance to a crude dichotomy. That 
interpretation, however, garbles the meaning of statistical significance.30 
A better way to understand statistical significance is as a description of the 
role of chance.31 It measures the consistency between data and the hypothesis 
being tested if the model used to compute the P-value is correct.32 The P-
value is the probability, assuming the null hypothesis (of no effect) is true 
                                                                                                                       
their testimony with the acknowledgment that none of this has been the subject of definitive study 
and may yet be disproved” and noting that the case settled shortly after his ruling). 
28. See ROTHMAN, supra note 23, at 148 (observing that statistics in epidemiology has two 
central roles, to “measure variability in the data in an effort to assess the role of chance, and . . . 
to estimate effects after correcting for biases such as confounding”). 
29. See Sander Greenland & Charles Poole, Problems in Common Interpretations of 
Statistics in Scientific Articles, Expert Reports, and Testimony, 51 JURIMETRICS J. 113, 116 (2011) 
(“Much misinterpretation arises from attempts to simplify complex concepts or statistical 
conclusions.”). 
30. Id. at 120 (using example of diet drug testimony). The P-value is a complex concept, 
hypothesizing randomly selected subjects in all conceivable study repetitions, defined as the 
“probability of getting data that conflict with the tested hypothesis as much as or more than the 
observed data conflict with the tested hypothesis,” providing that the tested hypothesis is correct, 
all other assumptions used in computing the P-value are correct, and conflict with the tested 
hypothesis is gauged by a particular measure called the test statistic. See id. at 117–18. Different 
models (of which there are many “conflicting . . . candidates for the correct model”) or test 
statistics may yield different conclusions. Id. at 118. 
31. See ROTHMAN, supra note 23, at 247 (discussing statistical significance). 
32. See Greenland & Poole, supra note 29, at 116 (explaining the concept of statistical 
significance). 
 
 
 
 
 
46:1057] LOST IN TRANSLATION 1065 
(and the study is free of bias) of observing as strong an association as was 
observed.33 While this may sound impenetrable to lawyers and judges, what 
they need to understand is that statistical significance is a measure of the 
relative consistency of the null hypothesis and the data. For example, a P-
value of 0.01 means that the data are not very consistent with the null 
hypothesis, whereas a P-value of 0.5 means the data are reasonably consistent 
with the null hypothesis.34 
Statistical significance level is a choice, not a mandate.35 Judicial rejection 
of studies that fail to meet “statistical significance” (meaning a P-value of 
0.05 or significance level of 95%) reflects a misunderstanding of why a 
particular P-value (or significance level) is chosen. The level of statistical 
significance chosen is a tradeoff between false positives and false negatives.36 
By setting a high significance level (low P-value), a scientist may avoid 
claiming an association where there is none, but at the risk of missing an 
association that is there. If the significance level is set too low (i.e., the P-
value is set too high), a scientist may include associations that do exist, but at 
the risk of claiming an association where there is none. Scientists 
conventionally attempt to minimize the probability of failing to reject a false 
hypothesis by setting the significance level at 95% (P-value at 0.05).37 But 
there may be good reasons for choice of a different significance level. 
The size of the study is one reason for choosing a significance level other 
than 95%; the size of the expected effect is another. Statistical significance 
depends on both the size of the study and on the size of the observed effect. 
Larger studies may achieve statistical significance even where there is no 
effect, while small studies may not show statistical significance even though 
there is an effect. 38  
Power, the probability that the study in which the hypothesis is being 
tested will reject the alterative hypothesis when it is false, increases with the 
size of the study.39 Power also increases with the degree of difference from 
                                                                                                                       
33. ROTHMAN, supra note 23, at 150. 
34. Id. 
35. See THEODORE COLTON, STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 128 (1974) (noting that the P-value of 
0.05 is chosen to minimize false positive errors). 
36. See BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 19, at 60–68 (discussing the inter-relationships 
between power, study size and biological context). 
37. See COLTON, supra note 35. 
38. Statistical tests, such as significance and relative risk, depend on the size of the study; 
in large studies, even small effects may be significant, while in a small study even a large effect 
may not be statistically differentiated from chance. See ROTHMAN, supra note 23, at 247 (“[F]or 
a given strength of association, more data results in a smaller P value.”). 
39. See, e.g., David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 253–54 (3d ed. 2011) 
(discussing the statistical concept of power). 
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the null hypothesis (the effect size). The investigator will thus choose the 
significance level based on the size of the study, the size of the effect, and the 
trade-off between Type I (incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis) and Type 
II (incorrect failure to reject the null hypothesis) errors.40 
Defense experts in toxic tort cases frequently assert that failure to disprove 
the null hypothesis means that the chemical in question has no effect.41 The 
significance level (or P-value) cannot tell you whether the null hypothesis is 
correct, however. Failure to reject the null hypothesis only means that the 
data could as well be explained by chance. In order to test the hypothesis that 
the chemical in question has no harmful effects, one would have to study that 
hypothesis directly, and the data would have to demonstrate that the 
alternative hypothesis (that there is an effect) can be rejected. In other words, 
ambiguous evidence is not negative evidence.42 
The unthinking use of statistical significance as a screening device leads 
to both over- and under-inclusiveness.43 Judges who categorically exclude 
any testimony based on studies with statistical significance levels of less than 
95% fail to recognize that the numbers are chosen because they reveal 
something about the study. Using statistical significance as a screening 
device is thus mistaken on many levels.44 
! Relative Risk  
Judges similarly misunderstand the concept of relative risk, often 
requiring a relative risk of two, or a doubling of the risk, before admitting 
epidemiology testimony.45 Relative risk is an epidemiologic term referring to 
                                                                                                                       
40. See BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 19, at 63 (2007) (discussing trade-offs between Type 
I and Type II errors). 
41. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 18, Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton, No. 
99CS00868, 2002 WL 31600035 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2002) (defense expert 
testifying that “human data demonstrates that DEHP does not pose any risk of cancer” when the 
data only failed to reject the null hypothesis). 
42. See Austin B. Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 PROC. 
ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295, 300 (1965) (“[T]oo often we deduce ‘no difference’ from ‘no significant 
difference.’”). 
43. See Kenneth J. Rothman, Significance Questing, 105 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 445, 446 
(1986) (“An algorithm for inference cannot substitute for thinking about the problem.”). 
44. See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226–27 (D. Colo. 1998); 
Haggerty v. Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1164 (S.D. Fla. 1996), aff’d, 158 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 
1998) (“[S]cientifically valid cause and effect determinations depend on controlled clinical trials 
and epidemiological studies.”). 
45. See, e.g., Allison v. McGhee Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(upholding exclusion of expert testimony based on epidemiological study with relative risk of 
1.24); Cotroneo v. Shaw Envt’l & Infrastructure, Inc., No. H-05-1250, 2007 WL 3145791 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 25, 2007) (excluding testimony based on a relative risk of less than 2); Hall v. Baxter 
Healthcare, 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996) (excluding testimony unless based on relative 
 
 
 
 
 
46:1057] LOST IN TRANSLATION 1067 
the increase of risk in exposed versus unexposed populations. Relative risk 
statistically describes the measured strength of association between a disease 
and a risk factor.46 A relative risk of one indicates that there was no increase 
in effect. Any increase above a relative risk of one indicates that there is some 
effect. The larger the relative risk, the stronger the effect. As epidemiologists 
have tried to explain to the courts, any increase in group risk from exposure 
to a chemical (that is, any relative risk greater than one) may be attributable 
to causation of the effect experienced by individuals within the group.47 
Using a relative risk of two as a cutoff for admissibility misconstrues these 
principles. Some courts mistakenly reasoned that a relative risk of 2 
(indicating a doubling of the risk) was required to meet the more probable 
than not standard for civil proof.48 That reasoning mixes apples and oranges.49 
Equating legal and scientific standards is logically unsound.50 As one 
prominent epidemiologist remarked, “It is possible that relative risks below 
2 meet the criteria for causality, and it is commonplace for relative risks well 
above 2 to fail to do so.”51 
Relative risk is a statistical test that (like statistical significance) depends 
on the size of the population being tested. It is defined as the percentage of 
risk in the exposed population attributable to the agent under investigation. 
Increasingly, courts are beginning to acknowledge that any relative risk 
greater than 1.0 shows some increase of risk in the exposed population.52 As 
long as there is a relative risk greater than 1.0, there is some association, and 
                                                                                                                       
risk of 2); Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, 950 F. Supp. 981, 999–1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996) 
(excluding testimony based on studies with relative risk less than 2); Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc. v. 
Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997) (conflating a doubling of the risk with the burden of proof 
necessary to establish causation and excluding as irrelevant testimony based on studies that did 
not meet this standard). For a discussion of this problematic view of relative risk, see Sander 
Greenland, The Need for Critical Appraisal of Expert Witnesses in Epidemiology and Statistics, 
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 294 (2004). 
46. See DAVID E. LILIENFELD & PAUL D. STOLLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 200–
02 (3d ed. 1994) (defining relative risk as the percent of risk in the exposed population attributable 
to the agent under investigation). 
47. See, e.g., Greenland, supra note 46, at 294 (discussing judicial misinterpretation of 
relative risk). 
48. See, e.g., Wells v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. A-06-CA-126-LY, 2009 WL 
564303, at *6 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (requiring testimony based on studies with a relative risk > 2 in 
order to meet the “more likely than not” legal standard). 
49. See BRACKEN, supra note 1, at 250 (discussing the differences between legal and 
scientific goals). 
50. See BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 19, at 65–67 (explaining the logical fallacy of 
confounding legal and scientific standards). 
51. BRACKEN, supra note 1, at 250. 
52. See Greenland, supra note 46, at 294. 
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experts should be permitted to base their causal explanations on such 
studies.53 
! Confidence Intervals 
The judicial exclusionary approach to relative risk seems to have shifted 
to confidence intervals, but entailing even more confusion. Confidence 
intervals, like statistical significance and relative risk, tend to be used by 
courts as thresholds for admissibility. With some regularity, courts exclude 
expert epidemiology testimony if the confidence interval includes the relative 
risk of one.54 (Recall that relative risk of one means that the null hypothesis 
of no effect cannot be rejected). This is a mistaken interpretation of 
confidence intervals. 
A confidence interval is defined as a range of possible (relative risk) 
values at a given significance level (P-value).55 A 95% confidence interval 
means that, over a vast number of repetitions, 95% of the intervals generated 
would contain the true association if the model were correct.56 If the model 
used to compute the confidence interval is correct, the data and the model 
provide more support for data points inside the limits of the interval than 
outside.57 A relative risk of one within the confidence interval does not mean 
there is no association, because confidence intervals include a range of 
values. If, for example, we have a 95% CI [1-10], the interval includes the 
relative risk of one, but it also includes the relative risk of ten.58 Thus the 
relative risk is as likely to be ten as it is one. 
Rather, the confidence interval limits indicate the values within which a 
certain percentage of all data are likely to fall.59 The whole point of a 
confidence interval is to give a range of values that if a study were replicated 
many times, would include the correct value 95% (or whatever other 
                                                                                                                       
53. See King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24, 46 (Neb. 2009) (declining 
to set a minimum threshold above 1.0 for relative risk because the studies “need not draw 
definitive conclusions on causation before experts can conclude that an agent can cause a 
disease”); see, e.g., Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharm., No. 05-CV-1531-L(BH), 
2008 WL 4878066, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (finding admissible testimony based on several 
epidemiology studies, although none of them had found a relative risk of 2). 
54. See, e.g., In re Viagra Prod. Liab. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078–79 (D. Minn. 
2008) (excluding testimony based on studies with confidence intervals that included 1). 
55. See Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 580 (3d ed. 2011). 
56. See Greenland & Poole, supra note 29, at 124 (explaining confidence intervals). 
57. Id. at 125. 
58. See id. at 123 (discussing common misinterpretations of confidence intervals). 
59. BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 19, at 61 (discussing statistical fallacies in the courts). 
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arbitrarily set level is chosen) of the time.60 The confidence interval is a 
“general guide to the amount of random error in the data.”61 
The rationale courts often give for the categorical exclusion of studies with 
confidence intervals including the relative risk of one is that such studies lack 
statistical significance.62 Well, yes and no. The problem here is the courts’ 
use of a dichotomous meaning for statistical significance (significant or 
not).63 This is not a correct understanding of statistical significance. 
The higher the significance level (the lower the P-value), the more 
stringent the exclusion of possible random error, and the wider the confidence 
interval.64 In other words, confidence intervals are supposed to inform the 
decisionmaker about relative risk through the width and location of the 
interval. In using confidence intervals as a surrogate for statistical 
significance, courts “ignore the potentially useful quantitative information 
                                                                                                                       
60. See ROTHMAN, supra note 23, at 150. Rothman explains the concept:  
A given confidence interval is tied to an arbitrarily set level of confidence. 
Commonly, the level of confidence is set at 95% or 90%, although any level 
in the interval 0% to 100% is possible . . . [i]f the level of confidence is set to 
95%, it means that if the data collection and analysis could be replicated many 
times, and the study were free of bias, the confidence interval would include 
within it the correct value of the measure 95% of the time . . . . It is better not 
to consider a confidence interval to be a literal measure of statistical 
variability, but rather a general guide to the amount of random error in the data. 
Id. 
61. Id. 
62. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Dow Agro Scis., 430 Fed. Appx. 102, 104 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(upholding exclusion of expert testimony where expert tried to explain that if a lower than 95% 
confidence interval—say, a 90% confidence interval—would not contain the relative risk of 1.0); 
Scharff v. Wyeth, No. 2:10-CV-220-WKW, 2011 WL 4361634, at *18 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 19, 2011) 
(finding that study with 95% confidence interval (limits 0.9-22.4) was insufficient to establish 
pharmaceutical defendant’s knowledge of breast cancer risk because it included the relative risk 
1.0); Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 08C-07-106, 2012 WL 1415777, at *3 
(Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 2012) (excluding testimony based on studies with 95% confidence 
intervals with limits including relative risk 1.0); Faust v. BSNF Ry. Co., 337 S.W.3d 325, 337 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (“To be considered reliable scientific evidence of general causation, an 
epidemiology study must (1) have a relative risk of 2.0 and (2) be statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level.”). 
63. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 23, at 164 (“For those who inappropriately place 
emphasis on whether a confidence interval contains the null value (thereby converting the 
confidence interval into a statistical test) . . . placing emphasis on the exact location of a 
confidence interval, equivalent to placing emphasis on statistical significance, is an inappropriate 
and potentially misleading way to interpret data.”). 
64. Id. at 150. 
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that the confidence interval provides.”65 Failure to understand that the 
confidence interval provides information through the width and location of 
the interval rather than as a cut-off for scientific validity is both inappropriate 
and misleading.66 
A striking illustration of the utility of confidence intervals is provided to 
judges in the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific 
Evidence.67 There, the authors provide a graph demonstrating how the 
confidence interval changes with P-value, so that while a confidence interval 
with P <0.05 (that is, a 95% confidence interval, corresponding to a 95% 
significance level) may include the relative risk of one, choosing a P-value 
<0.1 (that is, a 90% confidence interval) would include the values 1.1-2.2 and 
thus demonstrate some effect with confidence interval set at 90%. 
In other words, there is nothing magic about a confidence interval 
including (or excluding) a relative risk of one—it depends on the P-value (or 
statistical significance level) chosen.68 So, the courts’ frequent quotation that 
“where a confidence interval contains a relative risk of 1.0, the results of the 
study are not statistically significant”69 means only that at a P-value of 0.05 
(or 95% significance level, or confidence interval), no effect was one of the 
values included. Other values will be included, depending on the width of the 
confidence interval. At a lower (say 90%) confidence interval, the interval 
may include only relative risks greater than one. Interpreting the confidence 
interval is not a dichotomous choice, any more than is statistical significance. 
It is a description of the study, not a dichotomous signal. 
The complexity of causation assessments makes the urge to simplify the 
evaluation process through cursory checklists and rules of thumb hard to 
resist. Yet insisting on using statistical significance, relative risk and 
confidence intervals as screening devices simply makes no sense. It is a 
complete mistranslation of the science behind expert testimony. Rather than 
                                                                                                                       
65. See id. at 147 (using as an example the erroneous interpretation of a flutamide study in 
which the researchers claimed there was no effect on prostate cancer, contradicting the previous 
10 studies that had shown a modest benefit). 
66. Id. at 164 (noting that such an interpretation of confidence intervals is “an inappropriate 
and potentially misleading way to interpret data.”). 
67. See Green et al., supra note 56, at 580, fig.4 (discussing the use of confidence intervals). 
68. For example, in a case control study of the risks of congenital heart disease when 
mothers took chlordiazepoxide in early pregnancy, the researchers concluded that the results, 
showing 95%CI(1-10.5), meant that there was no effect. In re-analyzing the data, however, 
Rothman found that their conclusion unwarranted. See ROTHMAN, supra note 23, at 154. That is 
because the interval, which includes the relative risk of one, also includes the relative risk of 10.5 
with the same compatibility, and there is no reason to prefer rr=1 over rr=10.5. Moreover, the 
same data re-analyzed at 90%CI(>1<10), so that at 90% significance level, it is clear that there is 
some effect on congenital heart disease. Id. 
69. Green et al., supra note 56, at 621. 
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exclude studies that fail to meet these court-imposed thresholds, courts 
should admit and allow the adversary process to inform the jury about the 
strengths and weaknesses of these studies. 
! Statistics in Context: The Problem of Atomistic Admissibility 
Although statistics is fundamental to epidemiology, epidemiology is more 
than just applied statistics. Causal assessments do not exist in a vacuum. 
Statistical tests may tell us less about the data than other types of data 
analysis.70 They tell us something about how to design studies, and what those 
studies mean. Statistical results rarely imply high certainty for a hypothesis.71 
Multiple studies showing small but consistent effect may increase the 
certainty.72 Knowing the mechanism of action also increases the certainty.73 
But where the mechanism of action is unknown, or the observed risk level 
small, a wide range of hypotheses, including the null and alternative 
hypotheses, are possible.74 
This makes biological plausibility assessments vitally important, and such 
assessments require many studies, and many kinds of studies. Despite judges’ 
familiarity with the concept of separate pieces of circumstantial evidence 
building on each other to create a whole picture (a single brick does not build 
a wall), they appear to have difficulty with this concept when it comes to 
evaluating scientific evidence. 
Courts have been remarkably reluctant to view the studies on which 
experts base their testimony as parts of a coherent whole. In assessing 
causation, epidemiologists look well beyond a single study, to see how its 
results compare to the results in similar studies, and to “the entire body of 
research on the topic.”75 That would include toxicology studies (involving 
animal studies and in vitro studies) as well as chemical function tests. 
But many judges have reflexively required epidemiology studies to 
demonstrate causation; animal studies, cell studies and chemical structure 
                                                                                                                       
70. See W. Douglas Thompson, Statistical Criteria in the Interpretation of Epidemiologic 
Data, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 191, 191–94 (1987) (discussing data analysis). 
71. See Greenland & Poole, supra note 29, at 128–29 (explaining that even where there 
exists a large and consistent body of epidemiologic evidence there is a large degree of 
uncertainty). 
72. See BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 19, at 68 (discussing the importance of multiple 
studies in causation assessments). 
73. See id. (giving examples of infections diseases and medical device failures). 
74. Id. 
75. BRACKEN, supra note 1, at 128. 
 
 
 
 
 
1072 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
studies are often rejected as irrelevant, or treated as beside the point.76 This 
has made the more scientifically accurate kind of causation argument, based 
on multiple lines of study, frequently impossible to advance in court. 
Although many courts expressly stated that epidemiology evidence is not 
essential to proving causation, they have then excluded testimony based on 
studies other than epidemiology.77 
Instead, using the template set out by the Supreme Court in General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner,78 courts have exhibited a misguided tendency to 
separate the studies relied on by plaintiffs’ experts, requiring that each study 
relied upon wholly support the expert’s causation opinion, rather than 
examining whether the studies as a whole provide support for the general 
causation opinion.79 The tendency of lower courts to follow the analytic 
                                                                                                                       
76. See, e.g., Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1238 (W.D. Okla. 
2000), aff’d, 289 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the relevance of animal studies to causation 
arguments). 
77. See Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1198–99, 1203 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuit opinions holding that epidemiology was not required 
as a basis for causation testimony, but then excluding causation testimony that was not based on 
epidemiological evidence); In re Meridia Products Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 800–01 
(N.D. Ohio 2004). 
78. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
79. While each study should indeed be examined, it is the evidence as a whole that must be 
examined for its cumulative force. See, e.g., BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 19, at 47–49 
(discussing the importance of assessing the cumulative impact of studies used to support a 
biological theory of causation); see also CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE 
POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 138–40 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court made a mistake in Joiner 
by affirming the trial court’s piecemeal analysis rather than undertaking a cumulative analysis). 
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template of the Supreme Court80 is understandable, but it is not good analysis, 
and the result has been a very unscientific approach to causation evidence.81 
Because individual studies almost never sufficiently support a complex 
determination like causation, courts’ use of this kind of atomistic approach 
means that proving causation in many toxic tort cases is nearly impossible. 
First, it is highly unlikely that an epidemiology study with the precise 
parameters of a tort plaintiff’s exposure has ever been done, so it is unlikely 
that the kind of evidence judges prefer even exists. Second, multiple lines of 
inquiry in different disciplines reinforce the biological explanation of the 
links along the causal pathway between exposure and effect. 
                                                                                                                       
80. The Supreme Court in Joiner upheld the trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony 
proffered by an electrician who claimed that his lung cancer had been caused by the 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) contaminating the dielectric fluid used as a coolant in the 
transformers that the plaintiff often had to repair. 522 U.S. at 139–40. The plaintiff argued that 
his exposure to PCBs promoted the lung cancer to which he was prone to by virtue of genetics 
and through his own history of smoking. Id. Although PCBs were known to cause cancer, and 
Congress had banned their production or sale since 1978, the district court excluded the plaintiff’s 
expert causation testimony because it “did not rise above [the level of] ‘subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation.’” Id. (quoting Joiner v. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 
1994)). The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the district court had substituted its 
conclusions for those of the experts rather than determining the legal reliability of the testimony. 
Id. at 140. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 141. Examining each of the 
studies the experts relied on, the Court deemed each of the studies insufficient, standing alone, to 
support causation. Id. at 144–46. First, it upheld the exclusion of the animal studies, because they 
had used infant mice, exposed at high doses, and had developed a different form of cancer. Id. at 
144. Then, the Court turned to the epidemiology studies, and found each of them flawed as 
support. Id. at 145. The first study involved Italian workers who developed cancer from exposure 
to PCBs in a capacitor plant, but it concluded only that there was an association between exposure 
and the disease. Id. The second epidemiology study found an increase in lung cancer deaths of 
workers manufacturing PCBs, but not a statistically significant one. Id. The third study did show 
a statistically significant increase of lung cancer deaths, but the workers were exposed to mineral 
oil, rather than the transformer oil that Joiner was exposed to. Id. at 145–46. The fourth study also 
found a statistically significant association between exposure to PCBs and lung cancer, but the 
subjects of the study had also been exposed to toxic rice oil. Id. at 146. The Court held that “it 
was within the District Court’s discretion to conclude that the studies upon which the experts 
relied were not sufficient, whether individually or in combination, to support their conclusions,” 
and so reversed and remanded. Id. at 146–47. Thus, while the Court appears to be saying that it 
would have found no problem had the trial court evaluated the studies as a whole, neither the trial 
court nor the Supreme Court did so. Indeed, the Supreme Court went out of its way to analyze the 
studies one by one to find each insufficient to support the expert’s entire argument rather than 
examining each as supporting a small part of the overall argument. This has resulted in the 
overwhelming majority of courts evaluating the expert evidence seriatim rather than as a whole. 
81. See Bernard D. Goldstein, Toxic Torts: The Devil Is in the Dose, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 551, 
573–74 (2008) (noting the courts’ failure to understand the importance of animal toxicity studies, 
the courts’ over reliance on “rules of thumb” like relative risk of two, and statistical significance 
at the 95% level, as well as on epidemiology studies). 
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Excluding information from any source that contributes to this explanation 
is myopic. This approach results in courts scrutinizing the evidence for 
imperfections while simultaneously ignoring basic reasoning.82 Rather than 
adopting the interdisciplinary systems approach of the scientific community 
when evaluating evidence, courts using a piecemeal form of analysis became 
overly reductionist.83 
This piecemeal approach to scientific validity is rather surprising because 
judges are used to assessing circumstantial evidence as parts of a whole in 
areas outside of scientific evidence. As Susan Haack explains, “this 
epistemological question is really quite general, arising in virtually every area 
of inquiry.”84 Why courts think that biological causation is any different in 
this regard remains a mystery. 
Courts need to be aware that the evidence they consider most relevant—
human epidemiology studies—may simply not exist, or may be flawed in 
various ways, making them less than perfectly analogous to the plaintiff’s 
situation.85 But even more important is the recognition that no single piece of 
evidence about toxicity is ever likely to support a complex causation 
opinion.86 The best scientific reasoning is based on multiple lines of evidence, 
integrated into a theoretical whole. 
                                                                                                                       
82. See, e.g., Greenland, supra note 46, at 297–300 (giving examples of courts’ failures to 
recognize experts’ logical and statistical flaws). 
83. See Goldstein, supra note 82, at 569 (castigating courts for their “simple uni-
dimensional solutions for toxic tort issues which increasingly exclude modern scientific 
reasoning” built on interdisciplinarity). 
84. Susan Haack, Proving Causation: The Holism of Warrant and the Atomism of Daubert, 
4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 253, 263 (2008) (“[R]eliance on a whole mesh of evidence is 
ubiquitous—the rule, not the exception.”). 
85. See, e.g., McCarrell v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., No. A-3280-07T1, 2009 N.J. Super 
Unpub. LEXIS 558, at *9, *41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 12, 2009) (holding expert 
testimony based in part on animal studies admissible). 
86. See, e.g., Hyman & Armstrong, P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 104 (Ky. 2009) 
(quoting Globetti v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1180 (N.D. Ala. 2000)) 
(upholding admissibility in a parlodel case of causation testimony based on animal studies, case 
reports, chemical structure and activity, because “[s]cience, like many other human endeavors, 
draws conclusions from circumstantial evidence when other, better forms of evidence is not 
available”). For example, in In re Welding Fume Products Liability Litigation, No. 1:03-CV-
17000, MDL 1535, 2005 WL 1868046, at *33 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2005), when faced with 
assessing the reliability of plaintiffs’ general causation testimony, the court, acknowledging that 
“none of the ‘epi-studies’ presented by either side is perfect,” explained that these studies had to 
be examined in conjunction with other evidence of biological plausibility, including animal 
studies, case reports and case series. Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s approach in 
Gunderson was a holistic one. See 279 S.W.3d at 102. Arguing that case reports, animal studies 
and chemical analogies were “merely anecdotal” and that the only reliable method of proving 
causation was through an epidemiology study, defendants appealed a jury verdict. Id. There were 
two epidemiology studies of post-partum women taking Parlodel, both commissioned by the 
defendant pharmaceutical company Sandoz, but both had significant flaws. In one study, the 
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! Specific Causation 
Specific causation—that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by exposure to 
the defendant’s chemical—is almost universally required in medical 
causation cases.87 Moreover, heeding the caution in Kumho Tire about expert 
ipse dixit,88 the overwhelming majority of courts require medical experts to 
engage in a process the courts call “differential etiology.”89 The courts 
describe this process as “ruling in” all the possible causes of the injury, and 
then “ruling out” all but the chemical or drug to which the plaintiff was 
exposed.90 Notably, this is not the same as differential diagnosis, in which 
doctors identify the illness from which the patient is suffering in order to 
provide treatment.91 
While differential etiology may sound logical to lawyers and judges, this 
exercise simply is not part of medical (as opposed to courtroom) practice.92 
First, “ruling in” all potential causes cannot be done. Nearly every disease is 
caused by both genetics and environment. We simply do not know enough 
about either to decide what should be ruled in. Second, ruling out all but one 
cause is not feasible either. Epidemiologists now speak in terms of causal 
                                                                                                                       
patients were not trackable, and there were apparent misclassifications within the study. In the 
other, commissioned by the manufacturer to allay FDA concerns about adverse reaction reports, 
the data had been manipulated to lower it from a statistically significant risk rate of 2.86 to a 
statistically insignificant risk rate of 1.61 by excluding women with a history of seizures and 
women who had also taken a related drug, regardless of whether that other drug was in the 
woman’s system at the time of the adverse event. Id. A damaging memo in Sandoz’s file requested 
the researchers in the study to ‘“recut the data on late-onset seizures”’ in the final report. Id. The 
study had been rejected as misleading by three peer-reviewed publications. Id. No other 
epidemiology study had been done. Id. That left the plaintiffs with case reports, including 
challenge-dechallenge-rechallenge case reports, animal studies using dogs and rats, and chemical 
analogy studies with ergot alkaloids (the class of drug of which Parlodel is a member). Id. at 103. 
Although the court acknowledged that no piece of this evidence standing alone could prove 
causation, “together they tend to show that Parlodel can cause postpartum seizures in women 
taking the drug for [postpartum lactation suppression].” Id. at 106. 
87. See, e.g., Green et al., supra note 56, at 609 (noting that “the specific causation issue is 
a necessary legal element in a toxic substance case”). 
88. Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
89. See, e.g., Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1195 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(citation omitted) (“[D]ifferential etiology is a medical process of elimination whereby the 
possible causes of a condition are considered and ruled out one-by-one, leaving only one cause 
remaining.”). Notably, this is not the same as differential diagnosis, in which doctors identify the 
illness from which the patient is suffering in order to provide treatment. Id. at 1194 n.4. 
90. See, e.g., id. at 1198 n.5. 
91. See, e.g., id. at 1194 n.4. 
92. See Faigman et al., supra note 2, at 420 (observing that making group to individual 
inferences is “rarely a focus of the basic scientific enterprise”). 
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pies, where a number of causes may act in concert.93 Every sufficient cause 
involves the joint action of a multitude of component causes.94 Theorizing 
about the causal connection and testing the theories with data is the most that 
science can achieve. 
Moreover, applying a causal inference from epidemiologic data to a 
specific person is circular reasoning that “defeats the validity of the 
epidemiologic process.”95 Disease should be defined on the basis of certain 
criteria (signs and symptoms) rather than exposure.96 Running tests, 
observing signs and symptoms, are the basis of the diagnostic process, which 
distinguishes those individuals with a specific disease from those without it. 
Judicial failure to understand the inability of medical scientists to pinpoint 
individual causation is, in part, another translation problem. When we say 
that a patient’s symptoms of fever, chills, general weakness, or whatever are 
caused by kidney disease, what we mean is that these symptoms are the 
effects of the kidney disease. Certainly doctors are trained and experienced 
in linking symptoms with a particular disease. What they are not trained to 
do is determine the cause of the kidney disease. The most they can say is that 
certain risk factors have been identified, and perhaps inquire whether the 
individual patient was exposed to any of these risks. 
In other words, what medical doctors do is decide what illness the patient 
has in order to treat it. Even this process is often irretrievably subjective. It 
involves intuition, guesswork and judgment. The advent of evidence-based 
medicine in recent years, with its emphasis on population statistics, has 
increased the objectivity of diagnostic decision making.97 But this is a process 
of deciding what disease the individual is suffering from and how best to treat 
it. The idea is that integrating clinical expertise with the best available data 
will provide a “helpful framework for providers navigating the uncertainty 
inherent in patient care.”98 Nothing in this process requires (or permits) the 
                                                                                                                       
93. See ROTHMAN, supra note 23, at 24 (“[E]very causal mechanism [sometimes called a 
sufficient cause] involves the joint action of a multitude of component causes.”). 
94. Even infectious diseases require at least two component causes: exposure to a pathogen 
and lack of immunity. Id. at 250. 
95. Id. 
96. See id. at 250 (remarking that although disease criteria should have nothing to do with 
exposure, there is a long list of diseases where this is common, and citing the example of analgesic 
nephropathy, which is defined as kidney failure induced by analgesic drugs, making it impossible 
to evaluate the relationship of analgisics to kidney failure). 
97. See David L. Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t: It’s 
About Integrating Individual Clinical Expertise and the Best External Evidence, 312 BRIT. MED. 
J. 71, 71 (1996) (characterizing evidence based medicine as the “conscientious, explicit, and 
judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients”). 
98. MARK B. MCCLELLAN ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND THE CHANGING NATURE 
OF HEALTH CARE: 2007 IOM ANNUAL MEETING SUMMARY, at v (2008). 
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medical doctor to ascribe individual causation. Treatment in many cases is 
applied using the physician’s experience, but it can also be trial-and-error. 
For example, depression is treated with anti-depressants, some of which are 
not effective in some patients, and many patients require multiple drugs, but 
only in certain circumstances. 
 Statistical inference from the general to the specific is simply not 
something science can do.99 Statistical inference is a useful tool for describing 
average effects on populations (of people exposed to chemicals, for example). 
But it cannot tell us whether a particular individual within that population 
suffered the effect in question from exposure or for some other reason 
(genetic or environmental).100 
This is no denigration of the medical profession. Doctors are healers, and 
modern medicine has made incredible advances in saving human lives and 
keeping humans healthy. Many once-fatal diseases are now merely an 
inconvenience, thanks to treatments the medical profession has devised. But, 
like most experts, testifying doctors have a tendency to expound on matters 
in which they have neither training nor experience, and specific causation is 
one of those matters. 
Courts have long been familiar with medical experts testifying to a 
“reasonable degree of medical certainty,” and in the early years of Daubert-
imposed gatekeeping, courts rarely excluded testimony based on differential 
diagnosis. This, however, created opportunities for abuse, and in a few mass 
torts, such as asbestos, silicosis, and fen-phen, highly suspect mass medical 
screenings by a few doctors for litigation rather than treatment purposes were 
admitted as specific causation testimony, often without challenge.101 In a 
stinging, though advisory, opinion, Judge Janis Jack brought this problem to 
the fore in a multi-district litigation involving 10,000 silicosis claims that 
                                                                                                                       
99. See A.P. Dawid, Causal Inference Without Counterfactuals, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 407, 
408 (2000) (arguing the importance of making the distinction between the causes of effects and 
the effects of causes); A.P. Dawid, The Role of Statistical and Scientific Evidence in Assessing 
Causality, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 133–47 (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011) (noting the 
importance of making this distinction). 
100. See Dawid et al., supra note 3, at 369 (2014) (“[T]he imperative to admit testimony 
about whether the specific effect is an instance of some general effects is more the product of the 
demands of the law than the power of the science.”). 
101. See Lester Brickman, The Use of Litigation Screenings in Mass Torts: A Formula for 
Fraud?, 61 SMU L. REV. 1221, 1226, 1229 (2008) (discussing problems posed to the justice 
system by “doctors who are willing to mass produce mostly unreliable and arguably fraudulent 
diagnoses” and “criminal and civil justice systems [which] appear largely incapable of detecting 
or deterring, let alone sanctioning, [their] actions.”). 
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were generated through mass screenings.102 This opinion appears to have 
raised judicial consciousness regarding the problem of mass screenings, and 
to the subjective nature of differential diagnosis in general. 
Nonetheless, courts continue to require medical testimony of specific 
causation.103 When medical experts are honest enough to acknowledge that 
many diseases—like cancer—are mostly idiopathic (that is, of unknown 
cause and occurring with some baseline frequency in the general population), 
courts tend to exclude their testimony even where there is valid 
epidemiologic testimony establishing a causal link to exposure in humans.104 
This is yet another problem of statistical mistranslation. 
As discussed above, causation in cancer (and probably many other 
diseases as well), tends to have multiple causes.105 Some of these factors may 
be unknown (or idiopathic, in medical terminology)—unidentified genes or 
environmental exposures. Lung cancer, for example, may appear in the 
general population without any known toxic exposure. Nonsmokers get lung 
cancer. 
The lung cancer risk of nonsmokers not exposed to asbestos is one in one 
hundred thousand.106 By definition that is the relative risk of one. That is the 
background rate, the rate due to other, mostly unidentified, causes. The 
incidence of lung cancer in the population is greatly increased by smoking 
(rr=10).107 So one can say that smoking is a strong risk factor for lung 
cancer.108 
For any individual case of lung cancer, however, smoking is no more 
important than any of the other component causes, some of which may be 
                                                                                                                       
102. In re Silica Products Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 634 (S.D. Tex. 2005) 
(“[A]ssembly line diagnosing . . . is an ingenious method of grossly inflating the number of 
positive diagnoses.”). 
103. See, e.g., Dawid et al., supra note 3, at 366 (“[C]ourts’ expectations regarding the 
specificity of the proof are dictated by legal standards, rather than the ability of scientists to 
provide the necessary proof.”). 
104. See, e.g., Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 969 F. Supp. 2d 101, 109 (D. 
Mass. 2013) (excluding expert testimony on specific causation because of the “high probability 
that a cause cannot be identified.”). A Westlaw search of the all states database for the terms 
“specific causation” and “idiopathic” revealed 53 cases in which the courts rejected expert 
medical testimony of specific causation because the expert could not rule out idiopathic causes. 
In these cases, the courts have misunderstood the concept of biological causation, which very 
often has multiple causes, some of which are unknown. See infra notes 106–10 and accompanying 
text. 
105. See ROTHMAN, supra note 23 at 25 (noting that nearly every causal mechanism involves 
some environmental and some genetic factors). 
106. Id. at 200 ( discussing lung cancer risk). 
107. Id.  
108. Id.(explaining that smoking is a strong cause of lung cancer because it causes a large 
proportion of the cases). 
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unknown. As Rothman explains, “[w]ith respect to an individual case of 
disease . . . every component cause that played a role was necessary to the 
occurrence of that case.”109 From the individual perspective, there is no 
distinction between strong and weak causes; either something is a factor in 
the resulting disease or it isn’t.110 And determining which identically 
manifested disease was caused by which factor is beyond the capacity of 
medical science.111 It simply is not possible to infer logically whether a 
specific factor in a causal pie was the cause of an observed event.112 
The reason epidemiologists engage in relative risk analysis is to determine 
whether exposure to a chemical or other pathogen had any increase in effect 
over the baseline. When we know that several factors may be involved, we 
can measure risk among people exposed to the known factors, and then 
measure risk among people exposed to one but not the others.113 If there are 
unknown causes as well as known causes, the best we can do is determine the 
increased risk from exposure to the known causes in the population.114 
Looking backward from an individual case of lung cancer, in a person 
exposed to both asbestos and smoking, to try to determine the cause, we 
cannot separate which factor was primarily responsible. If all factors are 
                                                                                                                       
109. Id. at 25. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 204 (noting that “there is no way to tell, by direct observation alone, which clas of 
causal mechanisms is responsible for an individual case”).  
112. Id. at 203 (discussing the concept of causal pies). Rothman explains that both fair skin 
and exposure to ultraviolet light are risk factors for melanoma. Id. Both are causes, parts of the 
same causal pie. The parts of a causal pie may cause disease without any direct interaction, if they 
act through different mechanisms, or they may interact with each other and with background 
unidentified causes. Id. Each may interact with the unidentified causes. Alternatively, it could all 
be the interaction of both with unidentified causes. Id. There simply is no way to tell, by direct 
observation.  
113. Id. at 204 (discussing risk differences in smokers , people exposed to asbestos, and both 
to demonstrate that most of the risk among people with joint exposure to both smoking and 
asbestos is due to biological interactions between smoking and asbestos). 
114. For example, the court in Soldo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 244 F. Sup. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 
2003), was particularly confused about causation, despite having three court-appointed experts to 
guide it (all of whom acknowledged that qualified experts could legitimately disagree on the 
issue). First the court rejected the plaintiffs’ experts’ general causation experts for failing to show 
that Parlodel could cause intracerebral hemorrhage. Id. There were no epidemiology studies on 
the chemical. Then the court conflated the idea of general causation with specific causation, 
finding that because a large proportion of intracerebral hemorrhage have no known cause, 
plaintiffs’ specific causation experts would not be able to rule out unknown causes. Id. at 479–
80. For an excellent discussion of Soldo, see Joe B. Cecil, Construing Science in the Quest for 
“Ipse Dixit”: a Comment on Sanders and Cohen, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 967, 971–86 (2003). 
Taking their cue from Soldo, a series of recent cases have excluded specific causation testimony 
for failure to consider idiopathic causes. See William E. Padgett, Etiology Unknown: Using the 
Idiopathic Cause in Your Specific Causation Defense, FOR DEFENSE, Jan. 2013, at 56 (discussing 
the idiopathic defense and citing cases where it has been successful). 
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present, all were the cause. We cannot determine which case of lung cancer 
in an individual exposed to smoking, asbestos and unknown factors arose 
from which factor. 
Nothing in relative risk analysis, in statistical analysis, nor anything in 
medical training, permits an inference of specific causation in the individual 
case. No expert can tell whether a particular exposed individual’s cancer was 
caused by unknown factors (was idiopathic), linked to a particular gene, or 
caused by the individual’s chemical exposure. If all three are present, and 
general causation has been established for the chemical exposure, one can 
only infer that they all caused the disease.115 Courts demanding that experts 
make a contrary inference, that one of the factors was the primary cause, are 
asking to be misled. Experts who have tried to point that out, however, have 
had a difficult time getting their testimony admitted.116 
B.! Statistical Misunderstandings in Criminal Cases 
Judges in criminal cases also struggle to understand statistical inference 
drawing. There are two primary areas in which this is apparent, diagnostic 
cases involving medical diagnoses of intentionally inflicted trauma and 
pattern identification cases. 
! Diagnostic Issues in Criminal Cases: the Saga of Shaken-Baby 
Syndrome  
All the problems discussed above relating to specific causation testimony 
are inherent in criminal cases involving medical diagnoses.117 Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in shaken baby cases, where reasoning from individual 
instance (of a baby with a set of symptoms) to group data about the 
prevalence of these symptoms in the general population has confounded the 
                                                                                                                       
115. ROTHMAN, supra note 23, at 25 (explaining that “every component cause that played a 
role was necessary to the occurrence of that case”). 
116. See, e.g., Collins v. Ashland Inc., No. 06C-03-339 BEN, 2011 WL 5042330 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 21, 2011) (excluding expert specific causation testimony for failing to rule out idiopathic 
causes); Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 969 F. Supp. 2d 101, 115 (D. Mass. 2013) 
(excluding expert specific causation testimony because “differential etiology is not possible here 
given the large percentage of idiopathic cases of AML”); Pritchard v. Dow Agro Scis., 705 F. 
Supp. 2d 471, 496 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (excluding expert specific causation testimony for failing to 
rule out idiopathic causes). 
117. See, e.g., United States v. Grigsby, 712 F.3d 964, 968 (6th Cir. 2013) (involving 
testimony to a reasonable medical certainty that defendant had a mental illness at the time of the 
offense). 
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courts.118 Part of the problem is that the group data were flawed and 
incomplete.119 
Notwithstanding decades of medical testimony (usually from pediatricians 
specializing in child abuse) that a triad of symptoms (subdural hemorrhage, 
retinal hemorrhage and brain damage) was diagnostic of violent shaking, 
current research has demonstrated that many other factors also can cause 
these symptoms.120 In addition, research into the biomechanics of shaking has 
cast doubt on the ability of even severe shaking to result in such symptoms.121 
The claim that only inflicted trauma can cause the triad of symptoms is 
simply incorrect.122 A myriad of events other than trauma have been shown 
to be associated with the triad.123 Subdural hemorrhages are found in normal 
infants.124 Retinal hemorrhages are found in roughly 30% of newborns.125 
Brain damage in most shaken baby/abusive head trauma cases has been 
shown to be hypoxic-ischemic (lack of oxygen) rather than traumatic 
                                                                                                                       
118. For a description of courts’ widespread failure to respond to evolving evidence in shaken 
baby cases, see generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, Science-Dependent Prosecution and the 
Problem of Epistemic Contingency: A Study of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 ALA. L. REV. 513 
(2011). 
119. See generally Keith A. Findley et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, 
and Actual Innocence: Getting it Right, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209 (2012) (discussing 
the validity of the studies supporting and undermining shaken baby syndrome). 
120. A.N. Guthkelch, Problems of Infant Retino-Dural Hemorrhage with Minimal External 
Injury, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 202 (2012) (“Since subdural and retinal hemorrages 
(with or without cerebral edema) may also be observed in accidental or natural settings, I suggest 
that elements of the classic triad of retinal hemorrhage, subdural hematoma and cerebral edema 
would be better defined in terms of their medical features.”); see also Findley et al., supra note 
120, at 214 (the triad has been found in many conditions, such as falls, birth trauma, congenital 
malformations, genetic conditions, metabolic disorders, infections, and toxins, to name a few). 
121. Findley et al., supra note 120, at 214 (noting that biomechanical studies have 
consistently shown that shaking is not sufficient). Because the biomechanical studies cast doubt 
on shaking as being capable of producing the triad, child abuse pediatricians have switched the 
name from shaken baby syndrome to abusive head trauma. Id. at 220. The central tenets of the 
testimony have not changed, however, despite the name change, and experts continue to testify 
that the triad is caused by inflicted trauma. Id. at 220–21. 
122. See, e.g., Waney Squier & Julie Mack, The Neuropathology of Infant Subdural 
Haemorrhage, 187 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 6, 7 (2009) (emphasizing the complex neuropathology 
of the brain and its coverings). 
123. Guthkelch, supra note 121, at 204 (one cannot assume the triad is caused by trauma, 
rather than by natural causes). 
124. V.J. Rooks et al., Prevalence and Evolution of Intracranial Hemorrhage in 
Asymptomatic Term Infants, 29 AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY 1082, 1085 (2008) (finding that 46% of 
infants with normal births have subdural hemorrhages). 
125. M. Vaughn Emerson et al., Incidence and Rate of Disappearance of Retinal 
Hemorrhage in Newborns, 108 OPHTHALMOLOGY 36, 38 (2001). 
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injury.126 In other words, the brain damage is not—as claimed by countless 
experts—a symptom of trauma, but a result of oxygen deprivation. 
That the triad is associated with a host of factors other than inflicted 
trauma does not mean, of course, that an abused baby would never show signs 
of the triad. What it means is that the symptoms relied on as dispositive of 
abuse could be symptomatic of many conditions, only one of which is abuse. 
Experts, however, claim that if there is no other reasonable explanation given 
for the infant’s condition by its caregivers, the presence of the triad is 
diagnostic of child abuse.127 This is faulty logic, however. Just because the 
triad of symptoms is found and no one can think of another explanation does 
not justify the inference of criminal intent.128 
The fundamental problem here is the flawed statistical reasoning of the 
child abuse experts, and the widespread failure of courts to examine this 
reasoning.129 Even if such experts had data on the prevalence of the triad of 
symptoms in the infant/toddler population (if, hypothetically, we knew what 
the base rate of the triad was in the infant population, and what percentage of 
those cases were attributable to risk factors other than trauma) an expert still 
could not validly—that is with any more scientific basis than a rational 
juror—draw an inference from that data to the cause of an individual baby’s 
                                                                                                                       
126. J.F. Geddes et al., Neuropathology of Inflicted Head Injury in Children II. Microscopic 
Brain Brain Injury in Infants, 124 BRAIN 1299, 1304 (2001) (concluding that axonal damage in 
children with inflicted head injury is “diffuse vascular or hypoxic-ischaemic injury, attributable 
to brain swelling and raised intracranial pressure.”); see Mark S. Dias, The Case for Shaking, in 
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND EVIDENCE 362, 368 (Carole Jenny ed., 
2011) (noting that neuroimaging studies and post-mortem analyses make it increasingly clear that 
the cerebral and axonal damage in abusive head trauma cases is hypoxic-ischemic rather than 
traumatic in origin); Neil Stoodley, Non-accidental Head Injury in Children: Gathering the 
Evidence, 360 LANCET 271, 272 (2002) (in the pathophysiology of non-accidental head injury, 
hypoxic-ischemic damage is more common than traumatic axonal or shearing injury). 
127. See, e.g., Maze v. State, No. M2008-01837-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 4324377, at *6 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2010) (expert testimony that no explanation other than shaken baby 
syndrome accounted for infant’s injuries). 
128. See Guthkelch, supra note 121, at 203–04 (“[I]nstances in which both medical science 
and the law have gone too far in hypothesizing and criminalizing alleged acts of violence in which 
the only evidence has been the presence of the classic triad or even just one or two of its 
elements.”). 
129. The Supreme Court has not performed this reasoning well either, when it comes to 
shaken baby syndrome. See Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2 (2011) (reversing the 9th Circuit’s 
grant of habeas in a shaken baby case involving a grandmother convicted of murdering her 7-
week-old grandson). The 9th Circuit had granted habeas on the basis of newly discovered medical 
evidence (that other factors than intentional trauma could cause the triad) and the Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that because there was some evidence of trauma to the infant’s brain the 9th 
Circuit was “plainly wrong” that there was no evidence supporting the prosecution’s theory. Id. 
at 6–8. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor dissented, based on changes in the scientific 
understanding of shaken baby syndrome and the paucity of nonmedical evidence. Id. at 11 
(Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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death. The best the expert could offer the factfinder is to explain the general 
data and leave it to the jury to draw the inference. 
That is not at all what is happening in our courts. Instead, in hundreds of 
cases, the jury hears that the triad of symptoms does not appear absent 
abuse.130 The only exceptions such experts will acknowledge are falls from 
buildings and car crashes.131 If the symptoms are otherwise unexplained, the 
experts testify that the triad is diagnostic of abuse. 
Although such testimony is wholly lacking in empirical support, it is rarely 
questioned by the courts. Not only do the many published studies on shaken 
baby syndrome (or abusive head trauma as it is now called) fail to provide 
evidence in support of the triad/abuse hypothesis, numerous studies show that 
abuse is far from the only factor that can cause it.132 These errors would never 
have been perpetuated, however, had courts recognized the statistical flaw of 
asserting causation in the individual case. 
! Absence of General Population Data 
In most criminal identification evidence cases—apart from those 
involving DNA testimony—the statistical reasoning issues arise from an 
absence of data.133 The forensic science disciplines uniformly depend on 
pattern recognition, and the typical testimony is that each pattern is unique to 
an individual, so when patterns are found to match, that excludes all other 
                                                                                                                       
130. See Deborah Turkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the 
Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2009) (estimating about 200 convictions per year). 
131. See, e.g., State v. Mesa, No. 2 CA-CR 2011-0171-PR, 2011 WL 4379428, at *1 ¶ 3 
(Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2011) (expert testimony that the only explanations other than shaken 
baby syndrome for the infant’s triad of symptoms were falls from a second or third story, or down 
a flight of stairs); Maze v. State, No. M2008-01837-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 4324377, at *3–6 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2010) (expert testimony that no explanation other than shaken baby 
syndrome could account for infant’s injuries); State v. Fortener, No. E2008-01775-CCA-R3-CD, 
2010 WL 1241629, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2010) (expert testimony that nothing other 
than car crashes or violent shaking could account for the triad of injuries). 
132. See Findley et al., supra note 120, at 224–26, 264–96 (discussing the scientific literature 
on studies pro and contra the abusive head trauma hypothesis). 
133. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT] (finding 
that other than DNA testimony, criminal identification testimony is presented categorically, and 
without probability estimates). 
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individuals.134 The assertion being made by these experts is that “nature never 
repeats.”135 
This assertion is based theoretically on the product rule. The product rule 
yields the joint probability of individual events by multiplying the separate 
probabilities of independent events.136 Forensic scientists maintain that 
because there are many individual features of a particular pattern, the odds of 
repetition are vanishingly small. This assertion, however logical it may 
appear, is not actually based on statistics. 
For the product rule to be statistically sound, it must be based on empirical 
data. As the National Academy of Sciences pointed out in its report on 
forensic sciences,137 that is precisely what is missing from forensic science 
testimony other than DNA testimony. One would need to know, for example, 
that each feature of a given pattern is independent of the other features. Also, 
we would need to know the probability of each characteristic, that is, the 
frequency of its occurrence in the general population. Without knowing the 
frequencies of each characteristic in the general population, what is there to 
multiply? Even if we knew these factors (independence and frequency), 
uniqueness could not be established. Any factor greater than zero would yield 
a nonzero probability of another individual matching the pattern. However 
small the chance of repetition, it is not zero.138 
It is important, therefore, to know the size of the pool of possible matches. 
That is precisely what is missing from forensic science testimony other than 
DNA. Criminal identification techniques such as fingerprint, bite-mark, 
knife-mark, microscopic hair analysis, voice spectrography, shoe print 
identification, handwriting analysis and ballistics all suffer from an absence 
of general population data.139 In each of the identification techniques, crime 
                                                                                                                       
134. See KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALISTICS: THE 
PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 123 (CRC Press L.L.C. 2001) (noting that the “belief that 
uniqueness is both attainable and existent is central to our work as forensic scientists”). 
135. For a discussion of this uniqueness fallacy and its origins, see Michael J. Saks & 
Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individuation Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
199, 204 (2008) (explaining the fallacy of uniqueness assertions made by forensic science 
experts). 
136. Id. at 207. 
137. See NAS REPORT, supra note 134, at 149 (observing that forensic science experts 
present their conclusions categorically and without reference to population data). 
138. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 136, at 207 for an excellent explanation of the product 
rule. 
139. Recognizing the absence of general data behind most forensic science, Congress in 2006 
charged the National Academy of Sciences to examine the scientific validity of forensic science 
across all disciplines. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-272, at 121 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (charging the NAS 
“to conduct a study . . . as described in the Senate Report.”); S. REP. NO. 109-88, at 46 (2005) 
(noting the “absence of data” underlying the forensic sciences and listing eight charges to the 
NAS). 
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scene evidence is examined for indicia that “match” indicia belonging to the 
suspect.140 
Pattern matching is the foundation for most of the forensic science 
disciplines. But without knowing how frequently such matches occur in the 
general population, one cannot know how significant it is that the markings 
appear to be similar.141 Even if such data existed for these forensic techniques, 
the testimony would have to be given in terms of population estimates, as it 
is, for example, in DNA testimony. That, however, is not what happens in 
pattern-matching forensic science disciplines. Instead, the usual testimony is 
that because patterns match, they must have come from the same individual. 
Arson testimony suffers from the same lack of general data. Although fire 
causation is somewhat better studied in terms of general data than the 
criminal identification techniques, it still suffers from the problem of lack of 
general knowledge about fires.142 Fire experts examine signs and symptoms 
left in the wake of a fire in order to decide whether the fire came from 
“natural” causes or was set by an arsonist.143 
Many of the signs and symptoms experts describe as dispositive of arson, 
such as that accelerants burn hotter than natural fires, have been disproved.144 
The problem here is that not enough is known about the signs and symptoms 
of “natural” fires, so that ascribing criminal responsibility is a matter of 
speculation. At least in this area, however, the expert association has been 
engaging in research to attempt to obtain this general information. 
Nonetheless, permitting experts to testify beyond what is known about the 
characteristics of fires and ascribing causation is scientifically unjustified. 
                                                                                                                       
140. See Saks & Koehler, supra note 136, at 204 (explaining the fallacy of uniqueness 
assertions made by forensic science experts). 
141. See id. at 209 (“[T]he proper application of the [product] rule requires a set of reliable 
frequency estimates for the relevant set of forensic characteristics[, and even then] . . . the product 
rule necessarily falls short of establishing unique individualization.”). 
142. See, e.g., NAT’L FIRE PROTECTION ASS’N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION 
INVESTIGATIONS ¶¶ 5.1–5.1.2 (2011) [hereinafter NFPA] (noting the many complex variables and 
unpredictability of fire behavior). 
143. One of the most controversial cases of arson testimony, Texas v. Willingham, involved 
the defendant’s conviction for setting his home on fire, thereby killing his three children. See Paul 
C. Giannelli, Junk Science and the Execution of an Innocent Man, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 221, 
222–24 (2013) (discussing the testimony in the case and the subsequent controversies over the 
testimony).  
144. See NFPA, supra note 143, ¶ 6.2.2.2 (“Wood and gasoline burn at essentially the same 
flame temperature.”). 
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! POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Despite thousands of articles on Daubert, and evaluating scientific 
evidence, very few have focused on this problem of statistical mistranslation. 
Even fewer have attempted to solve the problem of inferring individual 
causation from general population data, and its converse assumption that one 
can infer something about the general population from the individual. Three 
recent notable articles however, have attempted to propose solutions to this 
conundrum. Although each proposed solution is, in my view, incomplete, 
each offers an important perspective. 
A.! Probability of Causation? 
In their article Fitting Science into Legal Contexts: Assessing Effects of 
Causes or Causes of Effects, Professors Fienberg, Faigman and Dawid seek 
to “begin to remedy” the disconnect between science as it is practiced and 
understood by scientists, and its legal use in the courtroom.145 The authors 
frame the issue as one of perspective: science infers the effects of causes, 
while law infers the causes of effects.146 Making this distinction, the authors 
assert, would help the courts to reason more logically about the statistically 
based testimony offered by experts.147 
By this, the authors mean that courts have difficulty reasoning from group 
data to the individual case. As examples of where the courts go astray, the 
authors proffer “differential etiology” in medical causation cases,148 pattern 
recognition in criminal identification cases,149 the opinion rule, in which 
experts are permitted to testify from the individual effect to the general 
cause,150 and class certification in employment discrimination cases.151 In 
each of these instances, the authors posit that the law’s “unrealistic 
                                                                                                                       
145. Dawid et al., supra note 3, at 361. 
146. Id. at 382–83. 
147. Id. at 382 (arguing that “having proof of both the [effects of causes] and the [causes of 
effects]” is the “key challenge” of translation). 
148. Id. at 367 (contending that differential etiology “has little scientific grounding and, 
indeed, is as much art as science.”). 
149. Id. at 369–70 (explaining that declaring a “match” from two patterns is invalid in the 
absence of group data—without knowing the frequency of the pattern in the general population, 
which—outside of DNA evidence—does not exist for most forensic sciences). 
150. Id. at 372 (noting that this is “contrary to basic precepts of the scientific method”). 
151. Id. at 379–80 (discussing the plaintiffs’ failed attempt to use general data about 
corporate culture to infer effects of discrimination in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 
2541 (2011)). 
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expectations” about what scientific proof can offer makes for illogical 
decisions.152 
The authors discuss two possible solutions: the odds ratio, and the 
probability of causation. Although the odds ratio at first blush appears to be 
a good solution, it turns out to be a blind alley. Despite being symmetrical 
between cause and effect, meaning it can be estimated from both prospective 
and retrospective studies (in contrast to relative risk, which measures only the 
effect of the cause),153 the odds ratio is not a great solution, the authors 
acknowledge, because “as was clear in the work of Galton . . . the regression 
of X on Y is not obtainable from the regression of Y on X.” 154 In other words, 
odds ratio does not solve the problem of making individual inferences from 
general data. 
Instead, the authors’ posit a “Probability of Causation”155 that involves 
several pages of elegant equations and tables. In the end, however, the authors 
are forced to acknowledge that “even if we start with the best possible 
information (perfect experimental results) about the [effects of causes], and 
use all relevant auxiliary information, we need to apply subtle logic to make 
inferences about the [causes of effects] (which will still, necessarily, remain 
imprecisely determined).”156 The problem with this solution is that while 
those factors might exist in concert in a thought experiment, they are hard to 
come by in our less than perfect world. 
Each of the factors is flawed. Few legal cases have perfect experiments 
that the expert can rely on. How “all relevant auxiliary” information could be 
known or available is an unanswered question. Asking judges to engage in 
subtle logic in a topic for which they were not trained seems rather 
preposterous. And few judges will permit testimony that is “imprecisely 
determined” because it sounds far too much like speculation. 
In scientific practice, “perfect experimental results” rarely are obtained 
and are almost never available for courtroom testimony. The real problem for 
scientific experts and the lawyers that employ them is how to make sense of 
the imperfect studies that do exist. Relevant auxiliary information may be 
unknown, or unavailable for courtroom presentation and possibly not even 
guessed-at. 
                                                                                                                       
152. Id. at 381. 
153. Id. at 375 (“[The odds ratio] can be estimated both from prospective studies where we 
‘control’ or condition on X [cause] and then examine Y [outcome], and from retrospective studies, 
where we control or condition on Y and then observe X.”). 
154. See id. (noting that while relative risk is often used as a measure of the effect of a cause, 
“its application to assessing the cause of an effect is more problematic”). 
155. Id. at 377. 
156. Id. at 377–78. 
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As for subtle logic, some jurists are better at this than others, but almost 
everyone could use some guidelines as to what this means and how to employ 
it. The reason that many judges use bright-line exclusionary rules (requiring 
a relative risk of two for admissibility or rejecting confidence intervals that 
include a relative risk of one, statistical significance at p-level 0.05) is not 
because they have thought through the meaning of the concept in the 
particular case, but because a bright-line rule can be applied reflexively (if 
mistakenly).157 
The authors suggest that a statistician be permitted to testify about the 
factors that go into the probability of causation, without actually saying what 
that probability is—something like eyewitness experts, who identify factors 
that may affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony, without actually 
opining on the particular eyewitness’s credibility. Similarly, a statistician 
could set up one of the authors’ tables, explain the factors going into each 
box, and the formula to assess the evidence, and let the jury have at it (with 
proper instructions about the “subtle reasoning” that is required to make the 
leap from general to individual causation). 
Perhaps so. If what the best scientists—including statisticians—validly 
can offer the jury is testimony about general causation, and if indeed there is 
“little scientific evidence to bear” on the question of individual causation, the 
courts should not be demanding this kind of testimony from them. 
B.! Best Practice Guidelines? 
Professors Faigman, Monahan and Slobogin offer a slightly different 
approach to solving this problem of inferring individual causation from 
general data in their article, Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific 
Expert Testimony.158 Noting that inference from group data to the individual 
is “rarely a focus of the basic scientific enterprise,”159 the authors seek to offer 
courts a set of guidelines to help them accomplish this. Acknowledging that 
neither Frye nor Daubert addresses this issue, they nonetheless look to the 
Daubert trilogy in crafting their guidelines.160 
First, the authors maintain that the standards applied to what they call 
framework testimony (and I’ve referred to as general causation or population 
data) ought to be applied differently to diagnostic testimony (specific 
                                                                                                                       
157. For further discussion of these imperfect factors, and how judges can decide their 
helpfulness to the jury, see generally BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 19. 
158. Faigman et al., supra note 2, at 417–18. 
159. Id. at 420. 
160. Id. at 439–40. 
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causation or individual data).161 The authors explain that while diagnostic 
testimony inferring individual causation may have “legal fit” in that it is 
relevant to an issue in the case (causation), it lacks “empirical fit” (whether 
the basis for the opinion can generalize to disputed legal issues).162 Rather 
than categorically admitting or excluding diagnostic testimony, the authors 
suggest a more nuanced approach.  
Rather than jettison specific causation testimony entirely, the authors 
instead contend that judges should examine five factors: materiality (which 
they describe as legal and empirical fit); witness qualifications; internal 
validity (comprised of testing, standards, error rates, peer review, general 
acceptance, type of rigorous analysis expected in the field); helpfulness 
(whether the testimony provides useful information for the factfinder); and 
avoidance of testimony misleading or distracting the factfinder.163  
Distinguishing between diagnostic testimony that identifies the illness 
from diagnostic testimony that identifies the cause of the illness, the authors 
maintain that the ability of diagnostic experts to gather information (by, for 
example, conducting various tests) is a benefit to the factfinder and therefore 
should not be categorically excluded, but run through the five factor test.164 
Applying their five factors to eyewitness expert testimony, , one would think 
that specific causation testimony would always fail the first factor. The 
authors hedge their bets, however, by maintaining that proficiency testing 
may substitute for empirical fit, and that courts need to look at how peer 
experts function.165 In their eyewitness expert example, specific causation 
testimony would fail because (outside the courtroom) such experts do not 
assess whether a particular eye witness was misled.166 
The second factor, qualifications, could not be met in the eyewitness 
expert example, because nothing in such experts’ clinical training permits an 
individual assessment.167 Subjecting eyewitness diagnostic testimony to 
                                                                                                                       
161. Id. at 480 (“Differential application of the five factors . . . is crucial if courts are to 
succeed at balancing the numerous legal and scientific considerations that influence when general 
research may be heard in court and the extent to which experts may apply that research to help 
resolve specific cases.”). 
162. Id. at 440–44. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 446. 
165. Id. at 451 (arguing that courts should use the Frye standard for determining the empirical 
fit of diagnostic testimony and Daubert for framework testimony). 
166. Id. at 466 (“[D]iagnostic testimony that reaches beyond the expert’s customary practice 
may well be irrelevant.”). 
167. Id. at 432. The authors (mistakenly, in my opinion) explicitly distinguish medical 
doctors, whom, they assert, have clinical training in making individual assessments. Id. at 447. 
But these individual assessments are made for treating the patient, not for determining causation. 
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stringent internal validity testing—the third factor—is problematic because 
there is no protocol for individual causation assessments (outside the 
courtroom), and no accuracy feedback loop. As for the helpfulness (value-
added) prong, the authors contend that since the framework testimony (based 
on the general data for eyewitness identifications) is strong, the jury can draw 
its own conclusions, and therefore the diagnostic testimony is not helpful.168 
The fifth factor is whether the testimony avoids misleading or distracting the 
jury, and here the authors contend that diagnostic testimony “could distract 
the jury from the scientific uncertainty inherent in the field” and therefore 
“probably is” more prejudicial than probative.169 The authors note that 
“diagnostic evidence is most likely to be prejudicial the further it departs from 
what framework scientists [general causation experts] can say with a high 
degree of certainty.”170 Here, however, the authors maintain that the adversary 
process will usually be able to limit the dangers.171 
In applying these factors, the authors say that if the proposed testimony 
fails any of the five factors, it should be excluded.172 Once the testimony 
passes the five-factor threshold test, then any weakness in one factor can be 
met by strength in another. And, the authors maintain, framework testimony 
[general causation] should be balanced differently from “particularized 
diagnostic evidence.”173 
I agree with the authors on many points. They have identified a major 
problem in expert testimony. What they refer to as the G2i problem is indeed 
endemic to our courts. This problem afflicts specific causation testimony in 
toxic torts, individual identification in criminal cases, as well as individual 
applications of general framework testimony such as eyewitness testimony. I 
also agree with their conclusion that unless this problem can be solved, 
                                                                                                                       
Doctors are trained to make diagnoses. They are experts in determining what illness the patient is 
suffering from; they are not trained to determine causation. 
168. Id. at 467. Helpfulness in diagnostic testimony depends on whether it helps jurors 
“reason from a valid empirical framework to a valid diagnostic judgment.” Id. at 468. 
169. Id. at 480. Again, the authors contrast their conclusion for eyewitness diagnostic 
testimony with medical causation testimony, contending that the jury would be unable to assess 
the different strands of general causation testimony, such as toxicology, epidemiology, etc. They 
do not discuss the reasoning behind this assumption, nor provide us with any data as to its basis. 
170. Id. at 477. 
171. Id. 
172. The authors do not come right out and say so, but it appears that eyewitness diagnostic 
testimony fails all five factors. The authors do say that while the five factors point toward 
admissibility of eyewitness framework testimony, they point in the opposite direction for 
diagnostic testimony. See generally id. at 443, 446, 468, 470. 
173. Id. at 474. 
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“empirically valueless diagnostic speculation will undermine the 
adjudication process.”174 
Their proposed solution, however, does nothing to address the statistical 
root of this basic issue. The G2i problem is foundational. Legal tweaking of 
balancing factors cannot solve it. Using a general consensus standard (as the 
authors suggest) for individuation testimony cannot solve the problem 
because as even the authors recognize, just because a “field claims the ability 
to apply general research to a particular case does not make it so.”175 Just 
because medical experts claim to be able to determine individual causation 
(and forensic scientists claim to individuate patterns) does not make it so. 
Rather, the only way to solve the G2i problem is to understand that 
statistics is the law of large numbers. Nothing in statistical science permits 
the individuation that courts demand. And although the authors do not say 
this directly, they imply as much by recognizing the lack of empirical fit of 
such testimony. 
Moreover their analysis of eyewitness expert testimony reveals these 
flaws, and the authors’ suggestion that such experts be limited to general 
framework testimony makes good sense. What is unclear, however, is why 
they would exempt medical testimony from this kind of analysis. Such 
testimony would fail for the same reasons that eyewitness individuation 
testimony fails. 
Empirical fit is similarly lacking in both eyewitness diagnostic and 
medical specific causation testimony. Determining causation simply is not 
what doctors are trained to do, anymore than are eyewitness experts, so they 
similarly ought to fail the second test, of qualifications.176 Medical doctors 
could not have received training in clinical causation assessments, so they are 
not qualified by training or experience (testifying in court does not qualify 
them).177 Medical doctors, by training and in their ordinary practice, decide 
what the illness is, and then treat it. Apart from microbial diseases like 
malaria and cholera, and contrary to the authors’ assertion,178 doctors do not 
(and cannot) determine what caused the particular ailment. The fourth factor, 
“value-added” helpfulness, is where the authors explicitly distinguish 
medical from eyewitness individuation testimony. They feel that jurors could 
draw their own conclusions from eyewitness general testimony, but not from 
general causation testimony in toxic torts, assuming that jurors could not put 
                                                                                                                       
174. Id. at 480. 
175. Id. at 440. 
176. Id. at 444. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 468 (“[D]octors help jurors decide whether ingestion of a drug known to be 
associated with cancer caused cancer in the case at hand.”). 
 
 
 
 
 
1092 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
together information from different strands of expertise such epidemiology, 
toxicology, chemical structure studies and the like. The authors do not, 
however, explain why the jury would be disadvantaged here, nor do they offer 
empirical support for such an assumption. As for the fifth factor, medical 
diagnostic testimony would appear to similarly distract the jury from “the 
uncertainty inherent in the field,” thus failing the fifth factor. 
Curiously, the authors mention and then fail to develop what could be a 
solution to the G2i problem in the courts.179 The Classification of Violence 
Risk (“COVR”) is a computerized actuarial risk assessment instrument that 
is based on data regarding risk factors for violent behavior. Depending on the 
individual being evaluated (usually for civil commitments), the software 
makes a prediction about the risk of violence posed by the individual being 
tested.180 Importantly, however, the instrument’s predictions are about the 
group to which the individual belongs, not risk that the individual will 
commit a violent act. The sample result cited by the authors is: 
Based on the data used to construct the Classification of Violence 
Risk, one can say with 95% confidence, that between 20% and 32% 
of persons with the same score as [person’s name] can be expected 
to commit a violent act toward another person in the next several 
months, with a best estimate of 26 percent.181 
Note what the instrument does not say: that the tested individual is 26% 
likely to recidivate. He is merely part of a group with an average recidivism 
rate of 26%. Some will recidivate more, some less. The inference about the 
tested individual’s likelihood of recidivism is left to the factfinder. This is 
similar to what Professors Faigman, Monahan and Slobogin propose as a 
solution to the eyewitness expert scenario: let the expert testify to the general 
data and let the factfinder draw the inference about the individual. The same 
could legitimately be done with medical causation testimony. 
Professors Faigman, Monahan and Slobogin have identified an important 
problem. Deriving individual inferences from general data is beyond the 
scope of current scientific expertise. Although their solution does not solve 
the problem they have identified, this paper is an important contribution to 
the dialog about translational errors from science to law. 
                                                                                                                       
179. Id. at 455 (discussing the Classification of Violence Risk instrument in the context of 
standards and error rates). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
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C.! Ditch Daubert for Individuation Testimony? 
Julie Seaman, in her article A Tale of Two Dauberts,182 recognizes that 
judges are reluctant to apply rigorous standards for evaluating scientific 
evidence in criminal cases. She notes that the NAS Report castigating 
forensic science has had little influence on judges.183 As a result, while courts 
nominally apply the Daubert standards to both civil and criminal evidence, 
there are systematic differences in application.184 
Professor Seaman notes the work-around that some courts have employed, 
by permitting experts to testify to the general data in criminal cases (in her 
examples of handwriting analysis and arson testimony) while leaving 
inference-drawing to the factfinder.185 She worries, however, that “it is 
questionable whether this limitation provides very much protection from the 
potentially unreliable conclusions against which it is directed.”186 She 
observes that when two exemplars are presented to the jury, one from the 
crime scene and one from the defendant, accompanied by expert testimony 
about similarities in the patterns, it is a foregone conclusion that the jury will 
find a match.187 
The two examples Professor Seaman has chosen for her study, however, 
are very different with respect to whether general data exists. Arson (fire 
origin and causation) testimony is based on general data about fires,188 
burning points of various materials, wind directions, etc.; handwriting 
testimony has no such database, just the ipse dixit of the expert regarding 
similarities in the exemplars. So while limiting the testimony of arson experts 
to general data without permitting individuation (that is, without permitting 
the expert to opine that this case involved arson) makes good sense, while in 
the absence of general data, handwriting experts have no value added to help 
the jury resolve an issue in the case. 
                                                                                                                       
182. Julie A. Seaman, A Tale of Two Dauberts, 47 GA. L. REV. 889, 903 (2013). 
183. Id. at 894 (noting that “many prosecutorial applications of the forensic ‘sciences’ that 
are routinely admitted, that have long been admitted, and that continue to be admitted despite the 
serious questions raised” in the NAS Report would not satisfy a Daubert inquiry as it is performed 
in civil toxic court cases). 
184. Id. at 892 (“[T]he Daubert standard indeed may be disparately applied to even very 
similar evidence when offered in criminal versus civil cases.”). 
185. Id. at 902 (observing that a judge concerned about the reliability of the testimony might 
find this approach “a move in the right direction”). 
186. Id. at 902–03 (noting that even when handwriting experts are limited to identifying 
similarities and differences in handwriting, prosecution experts will focus on the similarities and 
dismiss differences as “individual variation”). 
187. Id. at 902. 
188. Id. at 908 (Professor Seaman notes that while much arson testimony was based on 
assumptions that later proved to be false, the field has made progress with “fire investigation 
training and methodology” relying to a greater extent on scientific methodology). 
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In the face of academic disapproval and the NAS Report, most courts 
continue to admit forensic expert testimony that lacks scientific foundation, 
insisting that the testimony satisfies the Daubert test, which is “dishonest and 
misleading.”189 Professor Seaman observes that judges have little incentive to 
exclude forensic science expertise offered against a criminal defendant, and 
compelling reasons for admitting it.190 As a consequence, she suggests that 
rather than have trial judges pretending to apply Daubert even as they are 
busy circumventing it, a more honest approach would be just to ditch Daubert 
in criminal cases.191 
Unfortunately, however, ditching Daubert does not make the courts more 
honest or transparent. Instead, it subverts the search for truth to which our 
legal system aspires.192 The hypocrisy of having a higher decision standard in 
criminal cases, but permitting the jury to consider evidence that has no 
empirical basis, will gnaw at the foundation of our justice system. Moreover, 
if the rationale for ditching Daubert is that judges circumvent it, we would 
have to ditch Daubert for specific causation testimony in toxic torts as well. 
Evidence without empirical foundation should not be presented in either 
criminal or civil cases. 
! EDUCATING BENCH AND BAR ABOUT STATISTICAL INFERENCE 
DRAWING 
The most effective way to solve the problem of bogus testimony in our 
courts is through education. The issue of statistical inference drawing from 
general data to individual instance in scientific testimony has seldom been 
addressed. There are few academic articles on the problem. The Federal 
Judicial Center, although it has a chapter on statistics,193 does not discuss this 
problem. The NAS Report, which does identify the problem, has been 
ignored by the judiciary.194 
                                                                                                                       
189. Id. at 920. 
190. Id. at 918 (noting that in the face of prosecutors’ claims that they will be seriously 
prejudiced without forensic science testimomy, and that trial judges’ admissibility decisions are 
“exceedingly unlikely” to be overturned on appeal, judges are apt to cite longstanding legal 
precedent to permit expert testimony where the forensic sciences are concerned). 
191. Id. at 918–19. 
192. Professor Seaman also worries about this problem. See id. at 921, 921 n.129 
(acknowledging that her solution may seem “perverse” as it “allows the most questionable expert 
opinions to be admitted with little scrutiny whereas more reliable scientific evidence gets the full 
Daubert treatment.”). 
193. See Kaye & Freedman, supra note 40, at 211. 
194. See generally NAS REPORT, supra note 134. 
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Most people do not understand statistics—even those people, like 
scientists, who often use them in their work.195 Even though judges have 
become far more sophisticated in their approach to scientific testimony in the 
years since Daubert required their gatekeeping attention, statistical inference 
drawing has not yet penetrated most courts. And there are powerful incentives 
for judges not to look carefully at forensic techniques. But that is not an 
excuse to throw up our hands in despair. Rather, to encourage judges to take 
Daubert and the federal rules seriously, the following guidelines ought to 
help.  
A.! General Causation Issues 
First, the purpose of epidemiologists’ use of statistical concepts like 
relative risk, confidence intervals, and statistical significance are intended to 
describe studies, not to weed out the invalid from the valid. If the 
methodology is otherwise sound, small studies that fail to meet a P-level of 
5, say, or have a relative risk of 1.3 for example, or a confidence level that 
includes 1 at 95% confidence, but relative risk greater than 1 at 90% 
confidence ought to be admissible. And understanding that statistics in 
context means that data from many sources need to be considered in the 
causation assessment means courts should not dismiss non-epidemiological 
evidence out of hand. 
Some judges are quite capable of such analysis. The neurontin litigation is 
instructive in the care with which both sets of judges (federal and state) 
approached their gatekeeping duties.196 At issue was the general causation 
testimony of whether neurontin can cause suicidal behavior.197 The plaintiffs’ 
general causation testimony was based on the theory that neurontin altered 
brain chemistry by increasing the amount of gamma-amino-butyric acid 
(“GABA”) in the brain, leading to a decrease of other neurotransmitters like 
serotonin and norepinephrine, which prompts behavioral disturbances, 
                                                                                                                       
195. See id. at 5 (“The length of the congressional charge and the complexity of the material 
under review made the committee’s assignment challenging. In undertaking it, the committee first 
had to gain an understanding of the various disciplines within the forensic science community . . 
. .”). 
196. See In re Neurontin Mktg., 612 F. Supp. 2d 116, 131 (D. Mass. 2009). Not only were 
federal and state court claims involved, but the federal court admissibility claims were resolved 
under a reliability (Daubert) analysis, while the state claims’ admissibility determinations were 
resolved under a Frye standard. Id. at 122 n.3. Recognizing the importance of coordination of 
related claims, the admissibility determinations were conducted jointly, and, in a separate opinion, 
the state court adopted the federal court’s analysis and findings on reliability. Id. 
197. Id. at 123. 
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depression, and suicidal behavior.198 Plaintiffs based their theory on a Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) meta-analysis, animal studies, in vitro 
studies of human and animal tissue, and case reports,199 all of which were 
hotly contested by defendants as unreliable bases for the plaintiffs’ experts’ 
conclusions.200 Turning frequently to the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference 
Manual on Scientific Evidence, the court painstakingly analyzed each of the 
contested studies, and how they related to each other and the plaintiffs’ 
causation theory, before concluding that the plaintiffs’ expert causation 
testimony was reliable.201 
In each of the usually troubled areas of statistical significance, relative 
risk, animal studies, and in vitro studies, the court displayed active and 
thoughtful analytic prowess.202 The most important study for the plaintiffs’ 
causation theory was the FDA meta-analysis,203 and the defendants raised a 
number of difficult issues.204 The statistical significance problem arose 
because while neurontin was positively associated with “suicidality events” 
in the study, the associations were not statistically significant.205 The court 
did not find this dispositive, both because suicide is a rare event (making it 
difficult to obtain the large number of subjects that would be required to 
produce statistical significance), and because the studies relating to the class 
of drugs to which neurontin belongs did demonstrate statistical 
significance.206 As for relative risk, a relative risk of 1.57 and an attributable 
risk of 0.28 were enough to demonstrate a positive association, again because 
of the rarity of the event and the exclusion of high-risk subjects from the 
study.207 
In addition, the defendants contested the chemical and pharmacological 
similarity of neurontin/gabapentin to the drugs in the FDA study.208 However, 
because the plaintiffs’ experts were able to explain what gabapentin does in 
the brain (increase the quantity of GABA), the analogy was strong enough to 
render extrapolation from other GABA-increasing drugs reliable, even if the 
                                                                                                                       
198. Id. at 124. 
199. Id. at 132–56. 
200. Id. at 129–30. 
201. Id. at 130–59. 
202. See id. at 130–58. 
203. See id. at 133–37. 
204. See id. at 137–40. 
205. Id. at 137–38. 
206. Id. at 141. 
207. Id. at 138–39. It probably didn’t hurt that a “blue ribbon committee” at the FDA had 
reviewed the FDA statistics and conclusions and found them sound. Id. at 140. 
208. Id. at 129 (noting the defendant’s argument that the drugs were “distinct” from each 
other). 
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exact mechanism was unknown.209 Finally, rather than reject out of hand the 
plaintiffs’ animal, in vitro (tissue and cell), and case studies, the court 
carefully examined how each related to the plaintiffs’ overall causation 
theory, and how, in conjunction, they were sufficient to demonstrate the 
reliability of the expert causation testimony.210 
Cases like this demonstrate the feasibility of teaching non-scientist judges 
how to be intelligent consumers of scientific information. Thinking about 
causation in biological systems may not be taught in law school, but it should 
be. Thinking “like a lawyer” in our modern world includes more than 
teaching Newtonian-type causation; it requires addressing probabilistic 
causation issues. It requires an understanding of how complex systems work. 
B.! Specific Causation 
Specific causation testimony should be limited to what the medical 
witness actually knows and practices. Testimony about what injury the 
plaintiff suffered, and what tests were performed to diagnose that injury is 
undoubtedly helpful to the jury. But as for causation, once the medical 
testimony has established the injury diagnosis, testimony should be limited 
to group data. Permitting medical witnesses to opine on individual causation 
goes far beyond their expertise. Experts are neither trained nor practiced in 
determining causation (outside the courtroom); their inference drawing offers 
no special insight to the jury. Because experts are not any more adept at such 
inference drawing, it should be left to the jury to draw inferences from the 
general data. 
An example of how medical diagnostic testimony could be validly 
presented to jury can be derived from the way the COVR instrument presents 
the probable risk of future violence.211 Rather than claiming that the tested 
individual will or will not commit another act of violence (or even the 
percentage of risk the individual poses), the instrument presents its findings 
as a probability statement that the tested individual is within a group with a 
certain percentage risk of recidivism.212 By analogy, medical witnesses could 
similarly testify that the plaintiff, diagnosed with a particular disease (based 
                                                                                                                       
209. Id. at 141–44. 
210. Id. at 130–58. 
211. Barbara E. McDermott et al., Predictive Ability of the Classification of Violence Risk 
(COVR) in a Forensic Psychiatric Hospital, 62 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 430, 430 (2011) 
(discussing how COVR “predict[s] community aggression among civilly committed psychiatric 
patients”). 
212. Robert J. Snowden et al., Assessing Risk of Future Violence Among Forensic Psychiatric 
Inpatients with the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR), 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1522, 1522 
(2009). 
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on particular factors, tests, family history, etc.), falls within a group (because 
of exposure to a particular chemical) that has a (say) 10% increased risk of 
injury.  
This kind of limitation is not without precedent. Judge Jed Rakoff limited 
expert testimony in the ephedra litigation213 to conclusions that could validly 
be drawn from the relied-upon studies. No definitive epidemiological study 
existed for ephedra, which, as a nutritional supplement, did not need FDA 
approval for marketing.214 In the ephedra litigation, Judge Rakoff permitted 
the plaintiffs’ witnesses to testify based on animal studies, analogous human 
studies, and biologically plausible theories of the mechanisms involved, but 
only to opine that “there is a reliable basis to believe that ephedra may be a 
contributing cause of cardiac injury and strokes in people with high blood 
pressure, certain serious heart conditions, or a genetic sensitivity to ephedra” 
rather than to the probability that ephedra causes heart attacks or strokes.215 
Most of the ephedra cases settled shortly after this decision.216 By limiting the 
testimony to those inferences that could legitimately be drawn from the 
available evidence, Judge Rakoff balanced the realities of imperfect scientific 
knowledge with the requirements of sufficiently proving causation to achieve 
sound gatekeeping.  
C.! Criminal Identification Techniques 
The flaw in criminal identification and arson testimony is the absence of 
general data from which anyone—expert or layperson—can draw a rational 
inference. The problem with criminal identification techniques is that (with 
the exception of DNA identification testimony) there is no general data from 
which to draw inferences.217 DNA testimony is presented as general 
probability statements regarding the likelihood of randomly finding a similar 
configuration (a match) in the general population.218 Most other criminal 
identification techniques are presented categorically (as a match), usually to 
the exclusion of all other individuals.219 Rather than question the empirical 
                                                                                                                       
213. See Rakoff, supra note 27, at 1392. 
214. Id. at 1390. 
215. Id. at 1391. 
216. Id. 
217. See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 134, at 149 (observing that forensic science experts 
present their conclusions categorically and without reference to population data). 
218. See People v. Nelson, 185 P.3d 49, 87 (Cal. 2008) (discussing statistical methods in 
DNA testimony). 
219. See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 134 at 127–82. 
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basis for this testimony, courts simply accept expert claims regarding their 
ability to make particular judgments.220 
These criminal identification techniques differ from medical causation 
testimony in that there are no general data from which to draw inferences. 
Without a general population database, criminal identification techniques 
simply cannot meet relevance and reliability standards.221 All suffer from the 
fallacy of attempting to draw individual conclusions without any data on the 
prevalence of the relevant characteristics (striations in latent fingerprints, 
bruises in bitemarks, etc.) in the population. Limiting testimony here to 
inferences that can validly be drawn from general data will not work in the 
absence of general population data. From an epistemic point of view, such 
testimony is worthless and undermines the concept of justice. 
If courts were willing to take Daubert and Fed. R. Evid. 702 seriously, 
these techniques would not be admissible.222 The fact that non-DNA evidence 
continues to be a mainstay of criminal prosecutions is a travesty.223 As noted 
above, Congress attempted to ameliorate this problem by charging the 
National Academy of Science to examine the scientific validity of forensic 
science disciplines.224 When the NAS did so, it found them wanting.225 
The NAS Report carefully examined each of the criminal identification 
techniques commonly used in our courts and found them lacking scientific 
basis.226 It proposed a number of solutions, but the key was increased 
research.227 If such research were to be performed, the NAS Report was 
optimistic that the forensic science disciplines “might have the capacity (or 
the potential) to provide probative information to advance a criminal 
investigation.”228 The courts, however, have overwhelmingly ignored the 
NAS Report and continue to admit forensic testimony, Daubert or no 
                                                                                                                       
220. See Faigman et al., supra note 2, at 438–39 (noting the statistical inference problem in 
criminal identification testimony). 
221. See NAS REPORT, supra note 134, at 114–15 (finding that the FBI used a population 
database for DNA analysis and that this led to reliable evidence). 
222. Id. at 53. 
223. See id. at 41 (noting that only 10% of crime labs’ caseloads consist of DNA evidence). 
224. See supra note 140. 
225. See NAS REPORT, supra note 134, at 127–82 (castigating the lack of scientific 
foundation for pattern identification analysis in all disciplines in the forensic sciences). 
226. Id. at 149–83. 
227. See id. at 190 (calling for reform of the forensic sciences and outlining an agenda to 
expand independent research into the “accuracy, reliability and validity in the forensic science 
disciplines”). 
228. Id. at 127. 
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Daubert.229 I am not aware of a single case that has relied on the NAS Report 
in excluding forensic science testimony.230 
In all these instances, experts could legitimately testify about the general 
data, to the extent it exists. In most of these instances, however, there is no 
such data. But even where data exist, for example, in fingerprint databases, 
forensic scientists must be candid about the limitations of the data. In order 
for such testimony not to be misleading, factfinders must be told how little is 
known about the prevalence of various patterns. And it must be left to the 
jury to draw inferences from the general data, since the expert has no special 
knowledge in this regard.231 Which is, of course, precisely the opposite of 
what actually happens in our criminal courts, where the expert testifies that 
there is a match in the patterns, excluding the possibility that anyone other 
than the defendant could be the source. 
Excluding pattern identification testimony that has failed to obtain the 
necessary data is the only proper solution for the courts. A system that 
requires a higher standard for expert testimony in civil than criminal cases 
does not appear to comport with our idea that criminal cases should be held 
to a higher standard of proof. Permitting into evidence testimony without 
empirical basis makes our justice system an empty promise. 
! CONCLUSION 
Translation of key statistical concepts is important in achieving fair and 
accurate admissibility decisions. Understanding the ideas represented by 
concepts such as statistical significance, relative risk and confidence intervals 
is essential if expert testimony is to be evaluated rationally. Even without a 
deep knowledge of statistics, judges should be able to realize that these 
concepts are not items to be checked off some list of factors for scientific 
validity, but a way of describing the results of scientific studies. 
                                                                                                                       
229. See, for example, the following cases rejecting the argument that the NAS Report 
warrants exclusion of forensic testimony: United States v. Casey, 928 F. Supp. 2d 397, 400 
(D.P.R. 2013) (rejecting the argument that the NAS Report warrants exclusion of firearm 
testimony); Commonwealth v. Joyner, 467 Mass. 176, 181, 181 n.6 (2014) (fingerprint 
testimony); State v. McGuire, 16 A.3d 411, 436 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2011) (toolmark analysis); 
Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 567, 571 (Pa. 2013) (microscopic hair analysis); 
Coronado v. State, 384 S.W.3d 919, 927 (Tex. App. 2012) (bitemark testimony); People v. Luna, 
989 N.E.2d 655, 675 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (fingerprints). 
230. A search of the Westlaw Database “all courts” on October 7, 2014, using the search 
terms “NAS w/5 Report & forensic” yielded 38 cases, not one of which cited the NAS Report as 
a basis for excluding forensic testimony. 
231. See Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 61 n.22 (Mass. 2010) (attempting to 
sidestep the issues raised in the NAS Report and explaining that expert fingerprint testimony is 
admissible as “opinion, not a fact”). 
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Getting the courts to abandon their insistence that experts testify beyond 
their capabilities in medical causation and criminal identification cases may 
be more difficult. Individuation testimony gives the courts the alluring 
illusion of certainty. But courts are not unfamiliar with limiting expert 
testimony, knowing that experts, probably like all of us, tend to expound on 
matters beyond the boundaries of their expertise. A good example of judicial 
awareness of this propensity can be found in the In re: Welding Fume 
Products Liability Litigation Daubert order.232 There, noting that all the 
experts were “to varying degrees, guilty of the same fault: they reach outside 
their area of expertise to opine about the ultimate issue of, for example, 
whether exposure to manganese in welding fumes can cause Parkinson’s 
Disease,” the court limited the scope of nearly all the parties’ experts.233 
 On the other hand, “simply because a witness is not an expert about 
everything does not mean he is unqualified to offer expert opinion about 
anything.”234 Medical experts certainly know some things that would be 
helpful to a jury. They can ably testify about the process of diagnosis, what 
tests were run, and what signs and symptoms of disease were considered in 
arriving at a diagnosis. That is, a medical expert can testify about how the 
diagnosis of cancer, say, was made, and what alternative diseases were 
considered and ruled out—the process of differential diagnosis. Certainly that 
information would be helpful to the jury.  
What is not helpful to the jury (because it is beyond the scope of medical 
experts’ capabilities) is determining causation in the individual case. Doctors 
are no better at drawing individual inferences about causation than is the jury 
(or the judge). Their testimony is not helpful; it merely pretends to a certainty 
that does not exist. Judges should therefore limit the scope of medical 
testimony to what can legitimately be determined. The experts should testify 
to what they legitimately know, and the jury should draw the inference 
regarding causation. 
The same is true of criminal identification evidence. The National 
Academy of Sciences laid out the problems and the solution. For forensic 
science to be scientific—and therefore admissible—research must be done to 
establish general population data. Then, as with DNA testimony, the jury 
must be told what the population statistics are and left to draw its own 
inference. There is no way around it: if we actually care about justice and we 
wish to use science to achieve it, it has to be real science, not its bogus 
imitation. At the core is also the issue that judges, litigators, and juries think 
                                                                                                                       
232. No. 1:03–CV–17000, 2005 WL 1868046, at *6 (N.D. Ohio August 8, 2005). 
233. Id. (permitting only the neurologists to testify to whether manganese could cause 
Parkinson’s). 
234. Id. 
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that science is about absolute answers, cut-offs, and bottom lines. The 
Daubert decision, citing Popper’s philosophy, includes the idea that science 
provides only an approximation of the truth, and by repeated testing, comes 
closer to the truth, but never reaches “the absolute” truth.235 Applied to 
statistical reasoning, that means an understanding that statistics is a form of 
logic, not a mechanistic dichotomy. 
Thinking logically about science and causation issues is well within the 
capabilities of judges and the lawyers who inform them. One need not have 
taken courses in statistics, epidemiology, or medicine to understand sound 
reasoning. Law schools can help, by emphasizing probabilistic thinking as 
part and parcel of “thinking like a lawyer,” a goal all legal educators claim. 
Even without law school preparation, some judges have mastered these 
concepts. Emphasis on reasoning, and better translation of key statistical 
concepts, is key to this enterprise. 
                                                                                                                       
235. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 
